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INNOVATING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Natalie Ram 
ABSTRACT—From secret stingray devices that can pinpoint a suspect’s 
location, to advanced forensic DNA-analysis tools, to recidivism risk 
statistic software—the use of privately developed criminal justice 
technologies is growing. So too is a concomitant pattern of trade secret 
assertion surrounding these technologies. This Article charts the role of 
private law secrecy in shielding criminal justice activities, demonstrating 
that such secrecy is pervasive, problematic, and ultimately unnecessary for 
the production of well-designed criminal justice tools. 
This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, 
the Article establishes that trade secrecy now permeates American criminal 
justice, shielding privately developed criminal justice technologies from 
vigorous cross-examination and review. Second, the Article argues that 
private law secrecy surrounding the inner workings—or even the 
existence—of these criminal justice technologies imposes potentially 
unconstitutional harms on individual defendants and significant practical 
harms on both the criminal justice system and the development of well-
designed criminal justice technology. Third, the Article brings the 
extensive literature on innovation policy to bear on the production of 
privately developed criminal justice technologies, demonstrating that trade 
secrecy is not essential to either the existence or operation of those 
technologies. The Article proposes alternative innovation policies that the 
government, as both a funder of research and the primary purchaser of 
criminal justice technologies, is uniquely well-positioned to implement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Billy Ray Johnson was sentenced to life imprisonment 
without parole for a series of sexual assaults and burglaries that he says he 
did not commit.1 The primary evidence in the case consisted of traces of 
DNA found on items from three crime scenes, including a phone, clothing, 
and a zip tie investigators believed had been used to bind one of the 
victims.2 In order to link Johnson to the crime-scene DNA, investigators 
relied on TrueAllele, a privately developed and privately owned software 
 
 1 See Rebecca Wexler, When a Computer Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-are-harming-criminal-justice.html 
[https://perma.cc/AL5T-3G6D]. There are at least two significant cases involving probabilistic 
genotyping software in which the defendant’s last name is Johnson. Accordingly, this Article will refer 
to the case involving Billy Ray Johnson as the “Billy Ray Johnson case” for clarity. 
 2 See CYBERGENETICS, PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA V BILLY RAY JOHNSON, 
https://www.cybgen.com/news/cases/California-v-Billy-Ray-Johnson.shtml [https://perma.cc/NS4N-
L4CJ] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017) (describing the Billy Ray Johnson case and TrueAllele’s role in it). 
112:659 (2018) Innovating Criminal Justice 
661 
program for analyzing DNA mixtures that typical DNA analysis cannot 
resolve.3 Yet when an expert witness for Johnson sought to examine 
TrueAllele’s source code, she was rebuffed.4 TrueAllele’s source code, its 
creator Mark Perlin steadfastly maintained, is a trade secret.5 Perlin refused 
to make that code available for review even when Johnson’s attorney 
offered to sign a protective order.6 The judge in the case, meanwhile, 
refused to order that the source code be disclosed—but did admit the DNA 
analysis that TrueAllele generated into evidence.7 None of the 
investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, or even the judge in 
Johnson’s case were permitted access to the source code of the crucial 
software. Indeed, to date, no one outside of Cybergenetics—Perlin’s 
company—has seen or examined that source code.8 Yet, largely based on 
the DNA analysis that TrueAllele generated, Johnson was convicted.9 
Billy Ray Johnson’s case is not the only recent example of the 
criminal justice system relying on privately developed tools shielded by 
assertions of trade secret protection.10 The use of trade secrets to inhibit 
 
 3 Wexler, supra note 1; CYBERGENETICS, supra note 2 (observing that “[d]ue to the complexity of 
these low-level 3 and 4 person mixtures, human review of the data was largely inconclusive,” but that 
TrueAllele “yielded match statistics from 33 mixture items. 8 of these items linked Johnson to the 3 
crimes”). 
 4 Wexler, supra note 1. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Respondent’s Brief at 73, People v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2017) 
(quoting the trial court’s motion to review TrueAllele’s source code and explaining that “[t]he source 
code is a trade secret. I don’t think adequate showing has been made to justify the breech [sic] of that 
privilege”); id. at 74 (recounting that the trial court admitted TrueAllele’s analysis at trial over defense 
objections). 
 8 See ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA 101 (2015); Robert 
Gavin, Cybergenetics True Allele Casework DNA Study is Winner in Cold Case Murder Conviction, 
TIMES UNION (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-local/article/Cybergenetics-True-
Allele-Casework-DNA-study-is-6171690.php [https://perma.cc/XU89-YQUL] (“Only [Perlin] and one 
of his colleagues know the ‘source code’ behind [TrueAllele].”). Access to a machine on which a 
particular software program is installed is not access to that software’s source code. The code that is 
installed and runs on a particular machine is object code—a series of 1s and 0s that even few 
programmers can read and translate. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of 
the Growing Controversy Over the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 
97, 104 (2016). Source code, by contrast, is programming written in a language that other programmers 
familiar with that programming language can read, write, and understand. Id. at 103–04. Once 
complete, source code is “compiled”—translated—into object code. Id. at 104. 
 9 See Wexler, supra note 1; ABC News, East Bakersfield Residents React to the Conviction of Billy 
Ray Johnson, YOUTUBE.COM (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xoA_yUaPgvU 
(including a Deputy District Attorney stating, “It was the DNA that enabled us to know who raped these 
women”). 
 10 See, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal 
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (observing the rise of trade secret assertion in 
criminal cases). 
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disclosure of technical information pervades the criminal justice process—
from investigation, to trial, to sentencing. For instance, CMI, Inc., the 
manufacturer of the Intoxilyzer (a common breath test device for 
intoxication), has repeatedly fought efforts to compel disclosure of its 
devices’ source code in criminal cases, arguing that the source code is a 
valuable trade secret.11 Harris Corp., the private company that manufactures 
and sells the bulk of stingray devices—which effectively turn a cell phone 
into a real-time tracking device of startling precision—has gone even 
further.12 It secured the cooperation of the federal government in preventing 
disclosure of even the existence of these devices, not only to defense 
counsel but even to courts themselves, based in part on the device’s 
“valuable proprietary information”—their value as a trade secret.13 At 
sentencing, meanwhile, many courts now rely on recidivism risk scores 
generated by privately developed software whose formula for weighting 
input factors is, once again, not disclosed on trade secret grounds.14 Even 
the Solicitor General of the United States has acknowledged that “[s]ome 
uses of an undisclosed risk-assessment algorithm” may raise significant 
constitutional concerns.15 
 
 
 11 See, e.g., Charles Short, Note, Guilt by Machine: The Problem of Source Code Discovery in 
Florida DUI Prosecutions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 177, 182 (2009); Associated Press, Drunk Driving Cases 
Turn on Source Code, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 12, 2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11752290/ns/
technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/drunk-driving-cases-turn-source-code 
[https://perma.cc/ZN5N-NKCK] (in a drunken driving case, “[t]he company that makes the Intoxilyzer 
refused to reveal the computer source code for its machine because it was a trade secret”); see also 
Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1272 (2016) (observing that “[t]o date, only one 
group of litigants has successfully gained access to a breath machine’s source code, and even then, only 
upon court order after the state initially refused to disclose it”). 
 12 See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 104 (2017), http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/Joh-
FINAL_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QJT-SPWG]. 
 13 See Letter from Tania W. Hanna, Dir., Gov’t Relations, Harris Corp. & Evan S. Morris, Legal 
Analyst, Gov’t Relations, Harris Corp. to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n (Oct. 
12, 2010) [hereinafter Harris Letter], https://d3gn0r3afghep.cloudfront.net/foia_files/10-8-
14_MR13549_RES_ID2014-668.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9J7-JEC3] (revised request for confidentiality 
of Harris Corporation); see also Joh, supra note 12, at 106. 
 14 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶¶ 96–122, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749 
(approving the use of COMPAS, a recidivism risk scoring tool, despite nondisclosure of the underlying 
source code), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017); id. ¶ 51 (“Northpointe, Inc., the developer of 
COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade secret.”); see also Adam Liptak, 
Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-secret-
algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/6WZY-MSZB] (“Compas and other products with similar algorithms 
play a role in many states’ criminal justice systems.”). 
 15 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1240 (2017) 
(No. 16-6387), 2017 WL 2333897, at *18 [hereinafter U.S. Loomis Brief]. To be sure, the Acting 
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At each step in the criminal justice process, defendants, their 
attorneys, and sometimes even the judges in whose courtrooms innocence, 
guilt, or imprisonment is determined operate at an informational 
disadvantage due to claims of corporate secrecy. These technologies pit 
private law assertions of secrecy against criminal justice due process 
norms. 
This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. It 
demonstrates that, from investigation to sentencing, the role of private law 
mechanisms in shielding criminal justice activities is growing. It explains 
how these mechanisms are problematic for practical and potentially 
constitutional reasons. And it argues that the secrecy surrounding criminal 
justice technologies is not essential to their existence or operation. This 
Article thus offers a way through the growing thicket of trade secrecy 
assertion that now permeates criminal justice. 
First, Part I establishes a common thread of private secrecy tools—
trade secrets foremost among them—at work in American criminal justice. 
Technologies developed by private firms, subject to assertions of private 
law protection, are now embedded in multiple stages of the criminal justice 
process. As described above, police, prosecutors, and courts already make 
use of such technologies. Although scholars previously have shed light on 
some of these technologies, most have treated these technologies as though 
they operate in separate silos and have not fully appreciated the role of 
trade secret assertion throughout the criminal justice system.16 This Article 
provides a deeper and broader assessment. 
Second, Part II argues that the use of trade secrecy to shield criminal 
justice technologies from disclosure threatens to stall the development of 
effective (and appropriate) technology and puts new pressure on traditional 
criminal defense protections. Well-designed and well-tested algorithms can 
 
Solicitor General recommended that the Supreme Court deny certiorari in Loomis. Id. at *1. The Acting 
Solicitor General explained that, in his view, “the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly declined to find a 
due process violation” in Loomis’ case. Id. at *18. Nonetheless, the Acting Solicitor General’s 
concession that use of risk-assessment algorithms may raise constitutional concerns is itself significant. 
 16 See, e.g., Joh, supra note 12 (discussing private secrecy tools in the Fourth Amendment context); 
Roth, supra note 11 at 1274 (discussing the proliferation of algorithms throughout criminal 
adjudication, but only briefly describing the issue and costs of trade secret assertion surrounding those 
algorithms); Christian Chessman, Note, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, 
and the Constitution, 105 CAL. L. REV. 179, 209–13 (2017); Short, supra note 11 (discussing source 
code discovery difficulties regarding Florida DUI cases only); cf. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank 
Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
(discussing the rise of “Big Data” algorithms in consumer transactions, and focusing on credit scoring); 
W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419 (2015) (describing the promise 
and difficulties of highly complex predictive algorithms for personalized medicine). This is only now 
beginning to change. See Wexler, supra note 10 (identifying trade secret assertion at multiple points in 
the criminal justice process). 
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advance the cause of criminal justice, making the impenetrable 
interpretable or shifting aspects of decisionmaking from more to 
(hopefully) less biased data sources.17 But a lack of transparency—and 
accordingly an inability for defense counsel and others to verify and 
validate these data sources—makes even the best designed algorithm 
problematic. Access to source code and other similar information is often 
essential for defendants to fully interrogate the algorithms that have led to 
their arrest, conviction, or sentence. Private law protection surrounding the 
inner workings or even the existence of new technology thus threatens to 
undermine the ability of judges and defense counsel to ensure that criminal 
justice respects constitutionally significant privacy interests, condemns 
only the guilty, and punishes the guilty fairly. 
Third, Parts III and IV offer a way forward, bringing the extensive 
literature on innovation policy to bear on the production of privately 
developed criminal justice algorithms. Existing literature, where it exists at 
all, addresses these technologies within the confines of criminal law or the 
law of evidence.18 A broader perspective, bridging the fields of intellectual 
property and criminal justice, yields significant insights. 
Contrary to the claims of developers, trade secret protection is not 
essential for the production of useful algorithms. Innovation policy is more 
than simply intellectual property rights like trade secrets and patents.19 
Rather, mechanisms for encouraging innovation can fund companies doing 
research—for example, through grants—or reward companies for the 
successful products of that research—for example, through prizes or 
regulatory exclusivities. Tax policy can reward both innovation-focused 
research and its products. 
Unlike trade secrecy, most of these mechanisms can be coupled with a 
requirement to disclose source code or other relevant information beyond 
the confines of a protective order or nondisclosure agreement. Part III 
describes this multitude of policy mechanisms available for incentivizing 
 
 17 See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS 79 
(2016) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3A7-
A23P] (concluding that software programs like TrueAllele “clearly represent a major improvement over 
purely subjective interpretation”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.03 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014) 
(explaining that algorithmic tools in sentencing may “offer better predictions of future behavior than the 
clinical judgments of treatment professionals such as psychiatrists and psychologists, or the intuitions of 
criminal-justice professionals such as judges and probation officers”). 
 18 See, e.g., Joh, supra note 12 (criminal law lens); Roth, supra note 11 (same); Wexler, supra note 
10 (evidence law lens). 
 19 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (summarizing the literature on patents versus prizes versus grants and 
adding tax incentives to the range of innovation policy levers). 
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innovation in the field of criminal justice algorithms, of which trade 
secrecy is merely one. Identifying the uses, advantages, and potential costs 
of various innovation levers makes plain that deference to assertions of 
trade secret protection in the criminal justice arena is neither necessary nor 
inevitable. When circumstances demand greater transparency about how 
criminal justice technologies work, many tools of innovation policy are 
readily available to deliver the innovation incentive previously provided by 
secrecy. 
Part IV accordingly proposes how innovation policies might be 
adapted should trade secrecy give way in the face of constitutional and 
other concerns. In this context, where there is good reason to require 
disclosure surrounding court proceedings, developers are likely to respond 
efficiently to mechanisms other than secrecy if secrecy is no longer 
available. Moreover, achieving an alternate solution should be well within 
reach. One key actor in innovation policy—the government, through its law 
enforcement mission—is already inherently enmeshed in encouraging and 
compensating innovation in this field as the sole (or at least primary) 
purchaser of the fruits of that innovation. A key actor for enforcing 
disclosure is also already enmeshed in the tension between trade secret 
assertion and criminal justice norms—the courts. Courts should be 
empowered by the existence of alternative innovation policy levers to order 
trade secret disclosure without fear that useful algorithms will be lost. 
Indeed, if courts begin to order trade secret disclosure frequently or 
broadly, other government entities are well situated to institute 
complementary innovation policies through procurement and other 
policies, should additional compensation for innovation be necessary. Thus, 
courts need not wait for legislatures to act. 
I. A PROLIFERATION OF SECRET TECHNOLOGY 
Privately-developed algorithms have come to occupy a key role in 
criminal justice processes,20 and along with them, assertions of trade secret 
protection. Crucially, it is not merely the fact that algorithms are in use in 
criminal investigations and proceedings that makes this pattern of 
technological innovation worthy of note;21 nor is the fact that these 
algorithms are developed by private companies, rather than by the state 
 
 20 See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1975 (2017) (“While scientific 
instruments and cameras have been a mainstay in courtrooms for well over a century, the past century 
has witnessed a noteworthy rise in the silent testimony of instruments.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 21 Though this use is certainly noteworthy. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 11. 
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itself, that makes their use so problematic.22 Rather, it is the concomitant 
pattern of trade secret assertion that cripples courts and defense counsel—
and sometimes prosecutors, as well—from ensuring accuracy in criminal 
justice. 
Broadly defined, a trade secret is information that is “subject to 
reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy and derives independent economic 
value from its secrecy.”23 So long as the information at issue remains secret, 
the legal protections of trade secret law will attach indefinitely.24 Of 
greatest relevance here, so long as trade secret status remains intact, a trade 
secret holder may assert that status in litigation to attempt to bar or limit 
discovery of its protected information. 
This Part surveys the conflict between private commercial interests 
and criminal defense claims from criminal investigation, to trial, to 
sentencing. 
A. Secrecy in Policing 
In March 2016, State v. Andrews became the first judicial decision to 
hold that police cannot, without a warrant, make use of a stingray device.25 
A stingray device is a cell site simulator, which allows police to track a cell 
phone with near pinpoint accuracy in real time.26 It operates by mimicking 
a cellphone tower, forcing “all nearby phones within its range to provide it 
with identifying information.”27 And a stingray is a relatively small 
 
 22 Though this, too, is noteworthy. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 12. 
 23 W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1776 (2016). 
 24 Id. at 1777. 
 25 See State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016); Spencer S. Hsu, A 
Maryland Court is the First to Require a Warrant for Covert Cellphone Tracking, WASH. POST (Mar. 
31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-maryland-court-is-the-first-to-
require-a-warrant-for-covert-cellphone-tracking/2016/03/31/472d9b0a-f74d-11e5-8b23-538270a1ca31 
[https://perma.cc/95GJ-ENEJ]. 
 26 Joh, supra note 12, at 104. Stingrays are also known as “IMSI catchers.” Stingray Tracking 
Devices, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/stingray-
tracking-devices [https://perma.cc/UDU7-MMSY]. “IMSI,” in turn, stands for “international mobile 
subscriber identity,” which is “a unique number, usually fifteen digits,” that identifies a particular 
cellphone subscriber. Andrew Hemmer, Note, Duty of Candor in the Digital Age: The Need for 
Heightened Judicial Supervision of Stingray Searches, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 295, 299 n.32 (2016). 
 The term “stingray” comes from the name of a particular model of cell site simulator. See Devin 
Coldewey, Who Catches the IMSI Catchers? Researchers Demonstrate Stingray Detection Kit, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 2, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/02/who-catches-the-imsi-catchers-
researchers-demonstrate-stingray-detection-kit [https://perma.cc/4XPH-YHHP]. The company that 
manufactures the Stingray, Harris Corporation, also manufactures several other similar models, 
including the KingFish, the TriggerFish, and the Hailstorm devices. Joh, supra note 12, at 1044 n.105. 
Nonetheless, colloquially, the term “stingray” has stuck. See Coldewey, supra. 
 27 Joh, supra note 12, at 104; see also Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More than 
a Pen Register, and Less than a Wiretap: What the Stingray Teaches Us About How Congress Should 
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device—roughly the size of a suitcase.28 It can be “carried by hand, 
installed in a vehicle, or even mounted on a drone.”29 
A stingray device can be deployed in at least two ways. First, where 
police know the hardware number of a suspect’s cell phone, investigators 
can use a stingray to pinpoint that phone’s location in real time.30 This is 
what occurred in Andrews. Baltimore police used a stingray device called 
Hailstorm to track Kerron Andrews to a particular residence, where they 
arrested him on charges of attempted murder.31 Indeed, stingray devices 
appear to be widely used to track cell phones in drug and other criminal 
investigations.32 
Second, where police know a location of interest, investigators can use 
a stingray to identify all mobile devices in the vicinity of that location in 
real time.33 Police might rely on this use where, for example, they know the 
physical location of a suspect in a criminal investigation, but they do not 
know what phone she is using—perhaps because she frequently changes 
devices by using “burner” phones.34 By positioning a stingray device in the 
known vicinity of the suspect, investigators can collect the hardware 
number of that suspect’s phone. 
Importantly, in the course of either use, investigators will collect 
information about not only a target’s cell phone but also all other cellular 
devices in that area. This is because a stingray operates by tricking all 
cellular devices in its vicinity to connect to it as they would to a real cell 
 
Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134, 142–
43, 145–47 (2013). 
 28 Joh, supra note 12, at 104. 
 29 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 27, at 145. 
 30 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How ‘Stingray’ Devices Work, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2011), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/09/21/how-stingray-devices-work [https://perma.cc/A4PZ-CQTS]. 
 31 State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 329 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 
 32 Kim Zetter, Secrets of FBI Smartphone Surveillance Tool Revealed in Court Fight, WIRED (Apr. 
9, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/verizon-rigmaiden-aircard [https://perma.cc/LHJ7-M2E7]; 
see also Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in Thousands of 
Cases, BALT. SUN (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-
ci-stingray-case-20150408-story.html [https://perma.cc/94PE-5RNX] (reporting that Baltimore police 
have acknowledged using a stingray device “4,300 times since 2007,” while “[t]he Florida Department 
of Law Enforcement says its officers have used the device about 1,800 times”). 
 33 Valentino-DeVries, supra note 30. 
 34 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 27, at 147. A “burner” phone is “a prepaid, inexpensive cell 
phone intended for temporary use to communicate criminal activities while evading police detection.” 
Abigail Hoverman, Note, Riley and Abandonment: Expanding Fourth Amendment Protection of Cell 
Phones, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 551 (2017). 
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phone tower.35 Moreover, a stingray device may interrupt service to other 
devices in its vicinity.36 
Beyond these basics, however, little is publicly known about stingray 
devices, including about how they work and how often they are used. The 
acquisition and use of stingray devices in individual cases is difficult to 
track. To date, the ACLU has identified “72 agencies in 24 states and the 
District of Columbia” as stingray owners.37 At the same time, the ACLU 
asserts that that number “dramatically underrepresents the actual use of 
stingrays by law enforcement agencies nationwide” because “many 
agencies continue to shroud their purchase and use of stingrays in 
secrecy.”38 The secrecy surrounding law enforcement use of stingrays has 
also made it difficult to discover information about how exactly a stingray 
device works or can be used.39 
That secrecy is not merely a product of investigative intransigence or 
“law enforcement privilege.”40 It is instead the deliberately sought outcome 
of the primary manufacturer of stingray devices—Harris Corporation.41 For 
many years, Harris sold stingray devices to federal investigators.42 When 
Harris sought to expand sales to local law enforcement departments, 
however, federal law required the Federal Communications Commission’s 
(FCC) approval.43 And when Harris filed for the necessary authorization, it 
requested that information about its devices “be treated as confidential and 
withheld from public inspection.”44 Harris offered two reasons for this 
request: that disclosure “could cause significant harm to federal, state, and 
 
 35 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 27, at 147–48. 
 36 Kim Zetter, Feds Admit Stingrays Can Disrupt Cell Service of Bystanders, WIRED (Mar. 1, 
2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/03/feds-admit-stingrays-can-disrupt-cell-service-bystanders 
[https://perma.cc/6AZ7-CGA2]. 
 37 Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-
tracking-devices-whos-got-them [https://perma.cc/9KU5-YZX9]. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Robert Patrick, Controversial Secret Phone Tracker Figured in Dropped St. Louis Case, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/
controversial-secret-phone-tracker-figured-in-dropped-st-louis-case/article_fbb82630-aa7f-5200-b221-
a7f90252b2d0.html [https://perma.cc/UVV3-3KQ7] (“The ability to track cellphones through their 
service providers’ antenna network is commonly known and is openly discussed in court and on TV 
shows. But the full capabilities of the StingRay are not clear.”). 
 40 On the history of the law enforcement privilege, see Stephen Wm. Smith, Policing Hoover’s 
Ghost: The Privilege for Law Enforcement Techniques, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (2017). 
 41 See Joh, supra note 12, at 104. 
 42 Patrick, supra note 39. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Harris Letter, supra note 13. 
112:659 (2018) Innovating Criminal Justice 
669 
local law enforcement surveillance activities,” and that disclosure might 
similarly “cause significant harm to . . . Harris’ competitive interests.”45 
Despite identifying its competitive interests second, Harris devoted 
the bulk of its confidentiality request to this interest. Harris explained that 
public disclosure of information about stingrays “could compromise 
Harris’ ability to sell and continue to develop the Stingray® product line” 
because such disclosure “would provide other companies the opportunity to 
reverse engineer the surveillance technology.”46 Emphasizing the “many 
competitors that provide surveillance equipment to law enforcement 
officials,” Harris pressed that “any disclosure . . . regarding the Stingray® 
product would relinquish valuable proprietary information about how the 
technology was developed and the manufacturing process.”47 And Harris 
bluntly asserted that “[d]isclosure would result in substantial competitive 
harm to Harris” and “would reveal Harris trade secrets.”48 
Assuring the FCC that it had taken care to protect “proprietary aspects 
of its equipment design and manufacturing processes,” Harris requested 
that information about stingray devices “be withheld from public disclosure 
until and unless Harris notifies the Commission that such information may 
be publicly released.”49 To facilitate its request for confidentiality, Harris 
proposed that it would market and sell its stingray devices to 
“federal/state/local public safety and law enforcement officials only” and 
that “[s]tate and local law enforcement agencies must advance coordinate 
with the FBI the acquisition and use of equipment authorized under this 
authorization.”50 
The FCC granted Harris’s nondisclosure request, and the result has 
been a raft of rigid nondisclosure agreements between the FBI and local 
police departments.51 For instance, in order to acquire the Hailstorm device 
at issue in Andrews, the Baltimore Police Department had to enter into a 
nondisclosure agreement with the FBI,52 agreeing among other things not to 
disclose the use of the Hailstorm device—even to a court, and even if it 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Joh, supra note 12, at 106. 
 52 State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 337–38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (describing the 
nondisclosure agreement as a “condition of [Baltimore Police Department’s] purchase of” the Hailstorm 
device). 
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meant dropping charges all together.53 A similar nondisclosure agreement 
signed by the Tucson Police Department prohibits the City of Tucson from 
disclosing any information about its stingray use—even to “other 
governmental entit[ies]”—without Harris’s prior written consent.54 
Allocating the power to determine disclosure to Harris, rather than to a law 
enforcement agency, reinforces the “competitive interest” rationale for 
secrecy, while attenuating any relationship between nondisclosure and 
legitimate law enforcement concerns. Similar nondisclosure agreements 
have been unearthed for several other police departments around the 
country.55 
Pursuant to these nondisclosure obligations, police departments have 
gone to great lengths to obscure their possession and use of stingray 
devices. Prosecutors appear to have dropped charges rather than face 
questions about stingray use.56 Investigators have also stymied court 
overview of stingray use by obfuscating their use of the devices in court 
documents. In Andrews, for instance, the court admonished the police 
department for intentionally concealing its use of a stingray device from a 
judge when seeking a court order to track the defendant.57 Moreover, likely 
because of its nondisclosure agreement, “the State provided limited 
information regarding the function and use” of the stingray device in 
judicial hearings regarding the admissibility of information obtained 
through its use.58 
 
 53 Id. at 338 (summarizing the nondisclosure agreement, including its instruction that “[i]f 
necessary ‘the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore will, at the request of the FBI, seek dismissal 
of the case in lieu of using or providing, or allowing others to provide, any information concerning the 
Harris Corporation wireless collection equipment/technology’” (quoting Non-Disclosure Agreement 
Between Ernest Reith, Acting Assistant Dir., Operational Tech. Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, and 
Frederick H. Bealefeld, III, Police Comm’r, Balt. Police Dept. & Gregg L. Bernstein, Esq., State’s 
Attorney, Office of the State’s Attorney for Balt. City ¶ 5 (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1808819/baltimore-police-stingray-non-disclosure-
agreement.pdf [ https://perma.cc/6PFZ-CFE3])). 
 54 Kim Zetter, Police Contract with Spy Tool Maker Prohibits Talking About Device’s Use, WIRED 
(Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/harris-stingray-nda [https://perma.cc/SCB4-C62B] 
(quoting the nondisclosure agreement entered into by the City of Tucson, Arizona). 
 55 Joh, supra note 12, at 106–08 (discussing nondisclosure agreements with the police departments 
of Baltimore, Maryland; Tucson, Arizona; and St. Louis, Missouri). 
 56 See Patrick, supra note 39 (“Just one day before a city police officer was to face questions about 
a secret device used to locate suspects in a violent robbery spree, prosecutors dropped more than a 
dozen charges against the three defendants.”). More broadly, Patrick reports, “[o]fficials across the U.S. 
have been willing to drop cases rather than subject the technology to scrutiny by judges and defense 
lawyers.” Id. 
 57 Andrews, 134 A.3d at 338–39. 
 58 Id. at 340. 
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Private competitive concerns and assertions of trade secrecy thus have 
impeded both courts and defendants from knowing, examining, or 
effectively challenging how criminal cases are built or potential defendants 
identified and investigated. Significantly, as in Andrews, secrecy 
surrounding stingray use often shrouds investigative methods in mystery, 
even though prosecutors may not seek to rely at trial on data generated by 
the stingray device itself.59 These devices accordingly implicate different 
criminal justice interests than tools designed to produce trial evidence 
directly. 
B. Secrecy in Prosecuting 
Just as trade secret assertion pervades aspects of criminal 
investigation, so too has it come to occupy a central role in the production 
and presentation of key evidence for criminal trials. Two technologies 
exemplify the growth, persistence, and effectiveness of trade secret 
assertion surrounding the production of evidence: alcohol breath test 
devices and probabilistic genotyping software. Together, these technologies 
represent two generations of cases grappling with private trade secret 
assertion in the context of criminal discovery.60 
1. Alcohol Breath Test Devices 
Among the most longstanding tools in this category are breath test 
devices for measuring intoxication in drivers suspected of driving under the 
influence. These devices connect a small tube to a portable computer.61 
When a suspect blows into the tube, that air flows “into a chamber with an 
infrared light and a sensor that’s designed to detect alcohol vapor through a 
process called infrared spectrometry.”62 Breath test machines often sport 
names designed to convey “mechanical objectivity,” like the 
“Breathalyzer,” the “Drunk-O-Meter,” or the “Intoxilyzer.”63 
 
 59 Id. In Andrews, for instance, police used a stingray device to track Andrews to a specific 
location, where a subsequent search (with a warrant) uncovered a gun nearby. Id. at 326. Andrews 
argued that the gun should be suppressed as evidence tainted by the warrantless use of the stingray 
device—as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. The location data generated by the stingray device directly 
was not at issue because prosecutors did not seek to rely on that data during a trial. 
 60 See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 100. 
 61 See Declan McCullagh, Police Blotter: Court Won’t Release Breathalyzer Source Code, CNET 
NEWS (Feb. 3, 2009), https://www.cnet.com/news/police-blotter-court-wont-release-breathalyzer-
source-code [https://perma.cc/G5XU-MFHC] (describing how breath test devices work). 
 62 Id.; see also In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 
525, 528 (Minn. 2012) (describing leading breath test device as “us[ing] infrared absorption 
spectroscopy to measure the breath alcohol concentration of subjects who provide breath samples”). 
 63 Roth, supra note 11, at 1269. Importantly, these alcohol breath test devices are not the handheld 
tools used by law enforcement officers to conduct field sobriety tests at the roadside. See Birchfield v. 
North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2191 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“There is a common 
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Like Harris, manufacturers of breath test devices have strenuously 
resisted efforts to make information about their devices public or even 
accessible to criminal defense experts.64 For instance, Draeger, which 
manufactures the Alcotest, one popular breath test device, has refused to 
sell its devices to non-law enforcement individuals for independent 
testing,65 while asserting trade secrecy in its source code.66 In criminal 
cases, CMI, Incorporated, the manufacturer of the Intoxilyzer, another 
common breath test device, has repeatedly refused to disclose the source 
code for its devices on trade secret grounds.67 Source code is the 
“lifeblood” of a piece of software.68 It “dictates which tasks a program 
performs, how the program performs the tasks, and the sequence in which 
the program performs the tasks.”69 
Most of the time, this assertion of trade secrecy has prevailed. Courts 
have repeatedly vindicated manufacturers’ trade secret claims—directly or 
indirectly—by refusing to grant defendants access to the source code of 
breath test devices.70 In some cases, courts have explicitly acceded to 
manufacturers’ assertions of trade secret protection.71 In others, courts have 
 
misconception that breath tests are conducted roadside, immediately after a driver is arrested. While 
some preliminary testing is conducted roadside, reliability concerns with roadside tests confine their use 
in most circumstances to establishing probable cause for an arrest. The standard evidentiary breath test 
is conducted after a motorist is arrested and transported to a police station, governmental building, or 
mobile testing facility where officers can access reliable, evidence-grade breath testing machinery.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 64 Defendants have also faced significant difficulty in assessing whether the data indicating their 
intoxication is valid due to the paucity of data that many breath test devices actually produce for 
inspection. The Intoxilyzer 8000, for instance, produces only a “printout card” reporting blood alcohol 
concentration—it does not preserve any material that could be retested. See Roth, supra note 11, at 
1271. 
 65 See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., THE UNTESTABLE DRUNK DRIVING TEST (2009). According to 
Denbeaux and colleagues, Draeger has also prohibited the State of New Jersey, with which Draeger 
holds an exclusive contract to supply alcohol breath test devices, from making any Draeger device 
available for outside, independent testing. 
 66 State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008) (describing Draeger’s efforts to resist source code 
disclosure). 
 67 See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 11; McCullagh, supra note 61. 
 68 Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. at 100 (“With few exceptions, the clear majority of courts rejected defendants’ requests 
that a defense expert be granted access to the program’s source code.” (footnotes omitted)); see, e.g., 
State v. Burnell, No. MV06479034S, 2007 WL 241230, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007); Moe v. 
State, 944 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681–82 
(Crim. Ct. 2007). But see, e.g., State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 683–84 (Minn. 2009); State v. 
Chun, 923 A.2d 226, 226–27 (N.J. 2007). 
 71 See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 110 (identifying courts in Connecticut, Florida, and New 
York as denying access to source code on these bases); Chessman, supra note 16, at 205 (identifying 
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denied defense discovery requests for the source code of a breath test 
device on grounds that the state is not in possession of the relevant code 
and so cannot disclose it.72 
In Moe v. State, the Florida Court of Appeals cited both of these 
rationales—and demonstrated their relatedness—in denying a defendant 
access to the source code for Intoxilyzer 5000: 
It is without dispute that the State does not have possession of the source code 
because it is the property of CMI, Inc. It is also without dispute that the 
code is a trade secret of CMI, Inc. and that CMI, Inc. has invoked its statutory 
and common law privileges protecting the code from disclosure. Therefore, 
the State cannot obtain possession of the code.73 
The State of Florida appears to have deliberately persisted in its non-
possession of the relevant source code.74 
Moreover, in some cases, CMI has refused to cooperate even where 
courts have granted defense requests to examine the relevant source code. 
In one group of Florida cases, CMI refused any disclosure until the courts, 
whose orders CMI had flouted, levied fines against it totaling more than 
$500,000.75 Similarly, CMI has refused to disclose its source code even 
when that nondisclosure has prompted judges to dismiss charges.76 
In the few cases where the disclosure of source code has successfully 
been compelled, that disclosure has come only after much wrangling. In 
Minnesota, for instance, the Department of Public Safety had to sue CMI 
itself to gain access to the source code underlying the Intoxilyzer devices in 
 
three primary bases for denying defendants access to source code, including that “the source code is a 
trade secret”). 
 72 See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 110 (identifying a court in New York that denied access to 
source code on this basis); Chessman, supra note 16, at 205 (identifying “the state does not possess the 
source code” among the primary bases for denying defendants access to source code). 
 73 944 So. 2d at 1097; see also People v. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159, 167 (App. Div. 2008) 
(explaining that “[t]he Intoxilyzer source code was not the property of the State, since it was owned and 
copyrighted by its manufacturer, CMI, Inc., a Kentucky corporation, and is a trade secret of CMI, Inc.” 
and discussing similar cases); Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (denying discovery because the source code 
was “the property of a corporation that invoked statutory and common law privileges protecting the 
code from disclosure, thereby making it unobtainable”). 
 74 See Chessman, supra note 16, at 214; Short, supra note 11, at 195 (“Florida, however, has made 
no effort to obtain the source code itself so that it can ensure the reliability of the Intoxilyzer’s source 
code. Indeed, when the state had the opportunity to write some form of source code access into its 
contract with the manufacturer CMI, Inc., it declined to do so.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 75 See Short, supra note 11, at 183; Todd Ruger, Fines Rise in DUI Software Fight, SARASOTA 
HERALD-TRIBUNE (Mar. 9, 2008), http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20080309/fines-rise-in-dui-
software-fight [https://perma.cc/2K85-443Y]. In light of those fines, CMI sought to arrange a 
“controlled viewing” of its source code, coupled with a protective order and a nondisclosure agreement. 
Ruger, supra. 
 76 See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 11. 
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use throughout the state.77 CMI resisted that lawsuit as well, asserting once 
again that “the source code itself contained proprietary trade secrets which 
it would not disclose under any circumstances.”78 
There is good reason for defendants to seek to examine the breath test 
devices whose results are used to investigate, charge, and convict them. For 
one thing, human programmers are the ones who encode breath test devices 
with judgments about when and how to measure alcohol vapor and how to 
convert that into a number signifying intoxication.79 Sometimes, those 
judgments are wrong. For instance, one court observed that the Intoxilyzer 
model at issue could give false positive results—indicating intoxication 
where there is none—for individuals who suffer from diabetes, are on the 
Adkins diet, or experience occupational exposure to certain paint thinners.80 
These false positives are due not to inadvertent errors in programming but 
rather to intentional judgments about how to measure alcohol in the 
breath.81 A certain number of false positive results are the foreseeable 
consequence of an imperfect methodology that measures compounds in the 
breath without accounting for alternative (non-alcoholic) compounds that 
may yield similar test results.82 Commentators have also observed that 
breath test devices may give incorrect results if an individual either blows 
insufficient air or blows for too long into the device.83 In this Goldilocks 
scenario, an error may result from blowing too much or too little. 
Sometimes, even if its science is sound, a machine may malfunction 
for other reasons entirely. As developers identify bugs, patch them, and 
 
 77 See David Hanners, State Sues Breath-Test Machine Manufacturer, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS 
(Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.twincities.com/2008/03/03/state-sues-breath-test-machine-manufacturer 
[https://perma.cc/CR6G-XFC9]. 
 78 Id. (quoting Minnesota’s complaint (citation omitted)). Minnesota did not seek CMI’s source 
code eagerly. It initiated litigation against CMI only after the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded, in 
separate litigation, that the state was entitled to access the source code and that defendants were entitled 
to examine it. See In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 713 (Minn. 2007). 
 79 See Roth, supra note 11, at 1270–71. 
 80 State v. Bastos, 985 So. 2d 37, 41–42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Short, supra note 11, at 178. 
 81 See Bastos, 985 So. 2d at 41–42 (“[T]he machine is designed to examine only a portion of the 
infrared spectrum. For that reason, it is unable to produce a ‘fingerprint’ identification of ethanol to the 
exclusion of all other compounds. Instead, the machine is known to produce false positives. Examples 
of this would be compounds produced by the body as a result of the Adkins diet or diabetes. Exposure 
(usually occupational exposure) to certain paint thinners, lacquer, varnishes, and industrial cleaning 
solvents can also produce false positives.”). 
 82 See id. 
 83 See Roth, supra note 11, at 1272 (observing that the Intoxilyzer 5000 could give “erroneous 
‘deficient sample’ readings based on an artificially high breath-volume requirement”); Short, supra note 
11, at 179–80 (“the longer an individual blows into the breath testing machine the higher the breath test 
results can be” (footnote omitted)). 
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perform other updates, they may introduce unintended errors.84 One group 
of litigants discovered that the Intoxilyzer 8000 “was not properly 
programmed to differentiate between residual alcohol in the mouth and 
alcohol found in deep lung air, thus potentially leading to false positives.”85 
In another case, independent analysis of the Draeger Alcotest 7110 found 
that catastrophic error detection was disabled, “meaning that the Alcotest 
software could appear to run correctly while executing wild branches or 
invalid code for a period of time.”86 The analysts further concluded, “the 
Alcotest software would not pass U.S. industry standards for software 
development and testing.”87 In light of results like these, at least two states 
have rejected use of the Intoxilyzer 8000, while other courts have, on 
occasion, refused to admit its results at trial.88 
2. Probabilistic Genotyping Software 
Alcohol breath test devices are not the only tool prosecutors rely on 
that inject private trade secret assertion into public criminal proceedings. A 
newer entrant in this domain is probabilistic genotyping software, typified 
by TrueAllele.89 TrueAllele was the first (and remains among the most 
popular) of at least ten distinct software programs designed to “marshal[] 
complex statistics” to complete DNA analysis that traditional methods 
cannot.90 While some of these programs are open-source, meaning that their 
 
 84 See Ken Strutin, An Examination of Source Code Evidence, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 13, 2007), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=900005495696/An-Examination-of-Source-Code-Evidence 
[https://perma.cc/Q6V8-UN7A]; see also Chessman, supra note 16, at 186–92 (identifying “structural 
sources of error” that may unintentionally cause software to be unreliable or faulty, including 
“accidental errors,” “software updates to legacy code,” and “software rot”). 
 85 Roth, supra note 11, at 1271. 
 86 Lawrence Taylor, Secret Breathalyzer Software Finally Revealed, DUI BLOG (Sept. 4, 2007), 
http://www.duiblog.com/2007/09/04/secret-breathalyzer-software-finally-revealed 
[https://perma.cc/5FXC-GZKC]; see also State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 159 (N.J. 2008) (noting that the 
Alcotest’s catastrophic error detection had been disabled in the firmware version 3.11, and that “if 
utilized, it would ensure that the device would shut down if it encountered such an error”); Short, supra 
note 11, at 185 (discussing Chun and the source code errors that independent analysis uncovered in the 
Draeger Alcotest). 
 87 Taylor, supra note 86 (capitalization omitted). 
 88 See Roth, supra note 11, at 1272 nn.150–51 (observing that Alaska and Tennessee have declined 
to certify the Intoxilyzer 8000, while at least one Ohio state court has refused to admit its results). 
 89 See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 100 (noting the similarity of issues surrounding alcohol breath 
test devices and advanced DNA-analysis tools like TrueAllele). 
 90 MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97; see also Roth, supra note 11, at 1262–63 (describing TrueAllele as 
a “coup de grâce” for computerized genetic interpretation and observing that “several other companies 
now have competing but similar software”). 
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source code is freely available to the public, both TrueAllele and its 
primary competitor, STRmix, are not.91 
Traditionally, human analysts have “manually and visually 
interpret[ed] DNA markers.”92 Where those methods of analysis fall 
short—often with the most complex mixtures or degraded fragments of 
DNA—probabilistic genotyping seeks to deliver answers. Probabilistic 
genotyping software employs a “mathematical model[] that aim[s] to 
predict when and why erratic observed results are nonetheless 
explainable.”93 In so doing, such software “endeavor[s] to account for the 
unpredictable behavior of DNA samples with low template or too many 
contributors.”94 
Mark Perlin, who created TrueAllele and sells it through his company 
Cybergenetics, boasts that TrueAllele “can be applied to any DNA mixture, 
always giving an answer.”95 Indeed, Perlin markets TrueAllele as a tool for 
analyzing precisely those DNA samples that are most likely to yield 
inconclusive results: samples containing DNA from multiple individuals 
 
 91 See Roth, supra note 20, at 2019 (“Some developers have opened their source code to the public; 
others, such as Cybergenetics’s ‘TrueAllele’ program and New Zealand DNA expert John Buckleton’s 
‘STRmix,’ have not.” (citations omitted)); Lauren Kirchner, Where Traditional DNA Testing Fails, 
Algorithms Take Over, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/where-
traditional-dna-testing-fails-algorithms-take-over [https://perma.cc/7CTW-BPPD] [hereinafter 
Kirchner, Algorithms Take Over]; see also PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 78–79 (“As of March 
2014, at least 8 probabilistic genotyping software programs had been developed (called LRmix, Lab 
Retriever, likeLTD, FST, Armed Xpert, TrueAllele, STRmix, and DNA View Mixture Solution), with 
some being open source software and some being commercial products.”). Despite the fact that FST 
was developed by the New York Office of the Chief Medical Officer (OCME), that office has 
repeatedly resisted efforts to examine FST’s source code in criminal cases. See Lauren Kirchner, Traces 
of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques Became Tainted, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/nyregion/dna-analysis-evidence-new-york-disputed-
techniques.html [https://perma.cc/DRN4-NLP3] [hereinafter Kirchner, Traces of Crime] (explaining 
that, in response to defense counsel requests to examine FST’s source code, “the government refused to 
hand it over on the grounds that it was a ‘proprietary and copyrighted’ statistical tool owned by the City 
of New York”). 
 92 Kirchner, Algorithms Take Over, supra note 91. 
 93 MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Letter from Mark W. Perlin, Chief Sci. & Exec. Officer, Cybergenetics, to Jerry D. Varnell, Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2015/may/
Letter_to_FBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W7D-EBNZ] [hereinafter Perlin Letter]. 
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(“mixture” samples)96 and samples containing very few cells (“low copy 
number” samples).97 Perlin asserts that TrueAllele is “entirely objective.”98 
Yet, as with claims about the function and accuracy of stingray and 
alcohol breath test devices, Perlin’s claims about TrueAllele’s accuracy are 
difficult to verify because Perlin has invoked the shroud of trade secrecy. 
As in the Billy Ray Johnson case, Perlin has steadfastly refused to disclose 
TrueAllele’s source code, even under protective order.99 Perlin explicitly 
ties his nondisclosure to trade secrecy, writing that such secrecy is “needed 
by companies to innovate essential technology in a competitive world.”100 
And while Perlin and his colleagues have published a handful of validation 
studies in peer-reviewed journals, even those did not make the underlying 
data available for independent reviewers to assess.101 As set forth above, no 
one outside of Perlin’s company has seen or examined TrueAllele’s source 
code.102 
Despite this lack of vigorous outside review, courts in at least ten 
states have admitted TrueAllele’s results in criminal trials, while none have 
ordered disclosure of TrueAllele’s source code.103 In many cases, courts 
have relied on Perlin’s assertion of trade secret protection in declining to 
 
 96 See Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 2 (describing TrueAllele as “a computerized solution to the 
DNA mixture problem”); CYBERGENETICS, https://www.cybgen.com/welcome.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/SX5C-346A] (asserting, on Cybergenetics’ homepage, that TrueAllele “quickly and 
reliably solves DNA mixtures”). 
 97 CYBERGENETICS, TRUEALLELE® CASEWORK SERVICES (2013), https://www.cybgen.com/
services/service_e-brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR9N-WHF6] (brochure advertising TrueAllele and 
asserting, under frequently asked questions, that “TrueAllele Casework technology work[s] with Low 
Copy Number DNA”). In low copy number samples, the small number of available cells in a crime 
scene sample typically provides too little DNA for accurate analysis. 
 98 Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 3. 
 99 Roth, supra note 11, at 1274; Wexler, supra note 1. 
 100 See Mark Perlin, Computers Are Helping Justice, CYBERGENETICS (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2017/jun/Cybergenetics-to-New-York-Times-
Computers-are-helping-justice.shtml [https://perma.cc/PQ89-M5SN]. Perlin also declares that 
“privileged information,” like that protected by trade secret law, “benefits society.” Id. 
 101 Roth, supra note 11, at 1274. 
 102 See MURPHY, supra note 8, at 101 (“Perlin admitted that no other scientists had seen his code or 
reviewed it directly, and he stood by his refusal to make it available, defending it as a ‘trade secret.’”); 
Robert Gavin, Cybergenetics True Allele Casework DNA Study is Winner in Cold Case Murder 
Conviction, TIMES UNION (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-local/article/
Cybergenetics-True-Allele-Casework-DNA-study-is-6171690.php [https://perma.cc/XU89-YQUL] 
(“Only [Perlin] and one of his colleagues know the ‘source code’ behind [TrueAllele].”). 
 103 See TrueAllele Admissibility, CYBERGENETICS, https://www.cybgen.com/information/
admissibility/page.shtml [https://perma.cc/DJW2-69CA] (identifying cases admitting TrueAllele into 
evidence in California, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Virginia, and Washington State). 
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order source code disclosure.104 In the Billy Ray Johnson case, for instance, 
the trial court concluded, “[t]he source code is a trade secret. I don’t think 
adequate showing has been made to justify the breech [sic] of that 
privilege.”105 In another case denying disclosure, the judge simply stated, 
“[t]his source code is the intellectual property of Cybergenetics.”106 
Ordering disclosure “would not be reasonable,” that court explained, 
because it “would cause irreparable harm to the company, as other 
companies would be able to copy the code and potentially put him out of 
business.”107 
To date, only one American court has compelled production of the 
source code for probabilistic genotyping software in a criminal case. In 
July 2016, a federal district court ordered New York City’s crime 
laboratory to turn the source code of the lab’s in-house Forensic Statistical 
Tool (“FST,” a probabilistic genotyping tool) over to a defense expert for 
analysis.108 That expert concluded, “the correctness of the behavior of the 
FST software should be seriously questioned.”109 Shortly thereafter, the 
U.S. attorney’s office withdrew the FST-based DNA evidence in the 
case.110 The crime lab later announced that it was discontinuing use of FST 
altogether.111 Tellingly, however, the source code at issue in this case was 
not privately developed. Rather, it was developed by the crime lab itself, in 
the New York Office of the Chief Medical Officer (OCME).112 As such, the 
 
 104 See Wexler, supra note 10, at 12 n.48 (collecting cases in which courts have denied defendants 
access to source codes for probabilistic DNA-analysis software programs because the codes were 
alleged to be trade secrets). 
 105 Respondent’s Brief at 73, People v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2017) 
(quoting the trial court’s decision (citation omitted)). 
 106 Memorandum Order at 1, Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. C.P. Feb. 4, 
2016). 
 107 Id. at 2  
 108 Order, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CR-00565 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2016) (order denying 
crime lab’s motion to quash source code subpoena); Memorandum in Support of Application by 
ProPublica for Leave to Intervene, Lift the Protective Order and Unseal Judicial Records at 7, United 
States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CR-00565 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2017) [hereinafter ProPublica 
Memorandum]. 
 109 Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note 91. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. The laboratory announced that, in place of FST, it would use the privately developed and 
proprietary STRmix. Id. 
 112 Lauren Kirchner, ProPublica Seeks Source Code for New York City’s Disputed DNA Software, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/propublica-seeks-source-code-for-
new-york-city-disputed-dna-software [https://perma.cc/MR26-SS26]. 
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software was not subject to the same kind of assertions of trade secrecy as 
TrueAllele.113 
As the FST case makes clear, like breath test and other devices, the 
secrecy surrounding the details of how probabilistic genotyping software 
works is cause for concern. At the most basic level, DNA analysis is not 
the “crystal ball” it so often appears to be.114 While forensic genetic 
analysis rests on a scientifically sound basis,115 its use in practice has been 
riddled with errors.116 There are dozens of known scandals involving 
mistaken, sloppy, or fraudulent casework.117 Even if every crime scene 
investigator and lab analyst performs their work flawlessly, the resulting 
analysis may be inconclusive, unhelpful, or incorrect. This is because crime 
scene DNA is typically not a pristine sample. Instead, “[c]rime scene 
testing . . . is like seeking results from [a] dirty Band-Aid—after it has been 
in the trash for two weeks.”118 Such samples “may have been exposed to 
light, heat, moisture, or chemicals that can compromise the ability to get 
results.”119 
For its part, TrueAllele claims to mitigate these pitfalls by automating 
the DNA “interpretation process to give accurate and reliable answers,”120 
 
 113 Of course, the OCME nonetheless repeatedly resisted efforts to examine FST’s source code in 
criminal cases. See Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note 91. Disclosure of FST’s source code was 
originally subject to a protective order. See ProPublica Memorandum, supra note 108, at 7 (recounting 
the procedural history of this case). That protective order was subsequently vacated. Order, United 
States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cr-00565 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2017) (order unsealing most records 
previously sealed or redacted); see also Lauren Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New York Crime 
Lab’s Software for Analyzing DNA Evidence, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judge-unseals-new-york-crime-labs-software-for-analyzing-
dna-evidence [https://perma.cc/NES4-Y82W]. 
 114 Natalie Ram, Book Review, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIS. 426, 427 (2016) (reviewing MURPHY, supra note 
8); see MURPHY, supra note 8, at 311 (concluding that “DNA testing is neither savior nor cure-all; it is 
just another form of proof deserving of careful attention”). 
 115 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEED OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY, 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 133 (2009) 
[hereinafter NAS REPORT] (providing multiple reasons why DNA testing is scientifically sound). 
 116 See generally MURPHY, supra note 8 (documenting how DNA is collected, analyzed, disclosed, 
and used in criminal investigations and trials, and exposing its repeated documented scandals and 
errors). 
 117 Ram, supra note 114, at 429; see MURPHY, supra note 8, at 53–73 (describing insufficient 
internal audit procedures, proficiency testing, oversight by forensic laboratory accreditation 
organizations, and quality assurance protocols, as well as inadequate laboratory resources, training, and 
even qualified supervisory personnel at numerous forensics laboratories throughout the United States). 
For instance, Murphy reports that deceptive behavior by lab analysts—“suggesting work was performed 
that actually was not—has occurred so many times that there is a word for it: dry-labbing.” MURPHY, 
supra note 8, at 68. 
 118 MURPHY, supra note 8, at 19. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 3. 
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but that is not a complete response. For one thing, TrueAllele is marketed 
for use in the types of cases most likely to suffer from laboratory errors, 
even under the best of circumstances—those involving mixtures and low 
copy number samples.121 As Professor Erin Murphy has explained, “when 
low quantities of DNA are tested, the potential for contamination runs 
high.”122 An imperfectly cleaned workspace or an analyst’s accidental 
sneeze at the wrong moment may introduce foreign cells into an already-
complex mixture or low copy number sample, confounding accurate 
analysis of the number of contributors and their distinct genetic profiles in 
the original sample.123 More broadly, the factors giving rise to mistaken, 
sloppy, or fraudulent lab work are likely to be as significant, if not worse, 
where complex mixtures or low copy number samples are involved. 
Moreover, while Perlin claims that TrueAllele is equally capable of 
“resolv[ing] DNA mixtures without any limitation on the number of 
contributing individuals,”124 the President’s Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology disagrees.125 In a recent report, that Council concluded that 
TrueAllele is reliable only “within a certain range, based on the available 
evidence and the inherent difficulty of the problem.”126 Specifically, 
TrueAllele was determined to be reliable for, at best, “three-person 
mixtures in which the minor contributor constitutes at least 20 percent of 
the intact DNA in the mixture” and in two-person mixtures where the 
minor contributor accounts for at least 10 percent of the available DNA.127 
Unfortunately, these thresholds may be unknown in many cases, 
particularly those involving degraded DNA evidence not susceptible to 
traditional analysis. Indeed, based on TrueAllele’s marketing for and use in 
cases involving complex samples, one member of a forensic committee that 
 
 121 See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 122 MURPHY, supra note 8, at 76. (describing difficulties with low copy number samples). 
 123 Id. at 77. 
 124 Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 4. 
 125 See PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 80 n.215 (noting that “the interpretation of DNA 
mixtures becomes increasingly challenging as the number of contributors increases”). 
 126 Id. at 80. The Report issued the same findings for STRmix. Id. 
 127 Id. at 80 & n.216. In these cases, the Council observed that the mixtures involve “similar 
proportions” of DNA, which “are more straightforward to interpret owing to the limited number of 
alleles and relatively similar peak height.” Id. at 80 n.216. Where a crime scene sample contains a 
mixture of DNA from multiple individuals, a “minor” contributor is an individual whose DNA is 
present as a small proportion of the total available DNA in the sample. See KEITH INMAN & NORAH 
RUDIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 113 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining difficulties 
encountered in PCR when samples contain DNA from two or more people). If the disparity between 
major and minor DNA contributors becomes too great, this can make it difficult to assess the presence 
of the minor contributor and impossible to accurately identify the minor contributor’s DNA profile. Id. 
Cases with a smaller number of contributors and larger proportions of minor contributor DNA are less 
likely to suffer from these defects. PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 80 n.216. 
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approved TrueAllele for use in New York in 2011 subsequently retracted 
that support.128 
Even beyond the difficulties of working with complex samples, 
automating forensic interpretation does not render it free of human error 
and subjectivity. For instance, Perlin has altered TrueAllele’s source code 
more than twenty-five times.129 Yet, Perlin has given no explanation about 
what has been altered or why,130 and it is impossible to know whether those 
changes corrected undisclosed errors or inadvertently introduced new 
ones.131 Moreover, as with alcohol breath test devices, TrueAllele and other 
probabilistic genotyping software are the product of human judgments 
about how to interpret complex data inputs.132 As set forth above, 
probabilistic genotyping software rely on mathematical models to attempt 
“to account for the unpredictable behavior of DNA samples with low 
template or too many contributors.”133 But each such software package, in 
attempting to do the same thing, uses a somewhat different mathematical 
model or codes for that model differently.134 The consequence is that these 
 
 128 Order at 16, Ohio v. Shaw, No. CR-13-575691 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 10, 2014) (describing 
testimony by expert Dr. Ranjit Chakraborty that TrueAllele no longer had wide acceptance in his field 
and that he believed its applications for cases with closed sources and unknown application of variables 
still needed to be worked out). Chakraborty served as a member of the Scientific Working Group on 
DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), which establishes national guidelines for forensic laboratories in 
the United States. Katherine L. Moss, Note, The Admissibility of TrueAllele: A Computerized 
Interpretation System, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1033, 1069 (2015). Chakraborty explained that the 
New York approval of which he had been a part “only extended to TrueAllele testing a higher quantity 
of DNA from a single source.” Id. Moreover, Chakraborty asserted that “an independent party could not 
recreate or validate TrueAllele results without the source code.” Id. at 1070. 
 129 Roth, supra note 11, at 1273. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
 132 See MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97–98 (explaining that this type of software reflects how 
scientists and statisticians understand complex samples to behave, and that different software packages 
give weight to different factors and consequently may produce different results). 
 133 Id. at 97. 
 134 See PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 79 n. 211 (“Some programs use discrete (semi-
continuous) methods, which use only allele information in conjunction with probabilities of allelic 
dropout and dropin, while other programs use continuous methods, which also incorporate information 
about peak height and other information. Within these two classes, the programs differ with respect to 
how they use the information. Some of the methods involve making assumptions about the number of 
individuals contributing to the DNA profile, and use this information to clean up noise (such as ‘stutter’ 
in DNA profiles).”); see also MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97 (software packages rely on mathematical 
models that “differ in their details, and as a result the predictions they make as regard the same piece of 
evidence may differ as well”); Roth, supra note 20, at 1996 (“Even if a programmer is not ‘biased’ in 
the sense of making choices to further a preconceived goal, her analytically controversial choices can 
affect the accuracy of the machine’s scores and estimates. For example, in the DNA context, 
programmers have the power to set thresholds for what to count as a true genetic marker versus noise in 
determining which markers to report on the graphs used in determining a match.”); Wexler, supra note 
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supposedly “entirely objective”135 tools, when tested side by side, 
sometimes yield different results.136 
The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
concluded that probabilistic genotyping represents a significant and 
welcome advance in the science.137 But it also urged caution and study 
when making use of these new tools.138 Unfortunately, Perlin’s persistent 
and vociferous assertions of trade secrecy surrounding TrueAllele make 
study more difficult and caution more urgent. 
As experience with alcohol breath test devices and probabilistic 
genotyping software make plain, algorithmic tools for generating crucial 
evidence of guilt or innocence are multiplying and taking on increased 
importance. Where these tools are privately developed and shielded by 
assertions of trade secrecy, however, reliability and validity may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to verify. In the few cases in which courts have 
compelled disclosure of private source code for alcohol breath test devices, 
reviewers identified significant errors in almost every instance.139 In the one 
instance in which a court has compelled source code disclosure of 
probabilistic genotyping software, the State shortly thereafter abandoned 
use of that tool.140 The lack of broader access to source code—particularly 
for probabilistic genotyping software, about which scientific experts have 
expressed doubts regarding validity and reliability—is therefore deeply 
troubling. 
 
10, at 23 (“[S]oftware developers must therefore choose not only how to implement a statistical model 
through code but also which model of the underlying biological phenomena to use.”). 
 135 Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 3. 
 136 See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97 (“These models differ in their details, and as a result the 
predictions they make as regard the same piece of evidence may differ as well.”); PCAST REPORT, 
supra note 17, at 79 n.212 (describing an ongoing case in which STRmix and TrueAllele gave 
conflicting results); Roth, supra note 11, at 1273–74 (“[I]n conference simulations involving 
hypothetical mixtures, TrueAllele and several competing programs have come to different results in 
terms of guessing mixture ratios.”); Wexler, supra note 10, at 23–24 (“Competing software programs 
have been found to produce divergent results from identical test samples. In a recent child homicide 
case, two software programs reached different conclusions regarding whether a defendant’s DNA was 
included in a crime scene sample.” (citations omitted)). 
 137 PCAST REPORT, supra note 17. 
 138 Id. (“However, [these probabilistic genotyping software programs] still require careful scrutiny 
to determine (1) whether the methods are scientifically valid, including defining the limitations on their 
reliability (that is, the circumstances in which they may yield unreliable results) and (2) whether the 
software correctly implements the methods.”); id. (“Appropriate evaluation of the proposed methods 
should consist of studies by multiple groups, not associated with the software developers, that 
investigate the performance and define the limitations of programs by testing them on a wide range of 
mixtures with different properties.”). 
 139 See supra notes 79–88 and accompanying text. 
 140 Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note 91 (“Earlier this year, the lab shelved [probabilistic 
genotyping software] and replaced [it] with newer, more broadly used technology.”). 
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C. Secrecy in Sentencing 
Finally, privately developed criminal justice algorithms, shielded from 
disclosure by assertions of trade secret protection, have extended their 
reach even into criminal sentencing. Most prominently, courts have begun 
to make sentencing determinations based, at least in part, on recidivism 
scores generated by software whose weights and measures are, once again, 
not disclosed on trade secret grounds.141 
In July 2016, State v. Loomis became the first appellate case to 
address the relationship between asserted private trade secret protection and 
due process principles in sentencing.142 In that case, Eric Loomis pled guilty 
to fleeing the police and driving a stolen car.143 The trial court’s pre-
sentence report included a recidivism risk score generated by a program 
called COMPAS, and Loomis was deemed at high risk of committing 
another crime.144 Citing Loomis’s COMPAS score, the court sentenced 
Loomis to six years of imprisonment.145 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
affirmed that sentence.146 In so doing, the court rejected Loomis’s argument 
that a sentence based on a COMPAS score violates due process “because 
the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging 
the COMPAS assessment’s scientific validity.”147 So long as the COMPAS 
score is not the only factor on which a judge relies at sentencing, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of such scores in deciding 
whether and for how long a defendant should be incarcerated.148 
COMPAS, a privately developed proprietary tool owned and sold by 
Northpointe, Inc., is among the most widely used recidivism risk 
 
 141 E.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). 
 142 See id.; U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *22 (“The United States is not aware of any federal 
court of appeals or state court of last resort, other than the Wisconsin Supreme Court, that has 
confronted the federal due process issues that petitioner raises here.”). 
 143 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754. 
 144 Id. at 754–55; Ethan Chiel, Secret Algorithms that Predict Future Criminals Get a Thumbs Up 
from Wisconsin Supreme Court, FUSION (July 27, 2016), http://fusion.net/story/330672/algorithms-
recidivism-loomis-wisconsin-court [https://perma.cc/73ZZ-X7PQ]. 
 145 Chiel, supra note 144. 
 146 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 772. 
 147 Id. at 753. Loomis also argued that sentencing based on a COMPAS score violates due process 
“because COMPAS assessments take gender into account.” Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected 
this argument as well. 
 148 Id. at 753 (“We determine that because the circuit court explained that its consideration of the 
COMPAS risk scores was supported by other independent factors, its use was not determinative in 
deciding whether Loomis could be supervised safely and effectively in the community. Therefore, the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion.”). 
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assessment algorithms in the United States.149 COMPAS generates 
recidivism scores based principally on an interview with a defendant, as 
well as information recorded in the defendant’s criminal file.150 COMPAS 
is designed to measure both “static” variables, like a defendant’s age at first 
arrest and family criminal history, and “dynamic variables,” including 
personal beliefs and criminal associates.151 After analyzing these data, 
COMPAS generates three risk scores, one each for “pretrial recidivism,” 
“general recidivism,” and “violent recidivism,”152 which are reported on a 
10-point bar chart.153 That score is designed to represent a relative risk; that 
is, defendants with higher scores are deemed at higher risk of reoffending 
than other individuals in the same “norm group.”154 
Critically, defendants, defense counsel, departments of corrections, 
and courts who make use of COMPAS scores do not know how those 
scores are generated.155 That is, although Northpointe has disclosed the 137-
question survey that provides informational input for its program, it has 
refused to disclose how that information is used or weighted to arrive at a 
particular recidivism risk score.156 This is because Northpointe, which 
 
 149 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
[https://perma.cc/4CXA-Z5VK ]. In addition to COMPAS, “[t]here are dozens of these risk assessment 
algorithms in use. Many states have built their own assessments, and several academics have written 
tools. There are also two leading nationwide tools offered by commercial vendors,” of which COMPAS 
is one. Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 
2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm 
[https://perma.cc/Y9FF-EJHV]. Not all of these tools are shrouded by trade secrecy; indeed, several 
states have “develop[ed] and validat[ed] publicly available risk-assessment measures for consideration 
at sentencing.” U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *17 n. 5. 
 150 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754, 761 (describing Northpointe’s explanation about the information 
inputs used to generate COMPAS scores). 
 151 See id. at 761; Katherine Freeman, Note, Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Failed To Protect Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 75, 79, 
92 (2016). 
 152 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754. 
 153 Id.; Freeman, supra note 151, at 81. 
 154 See Freeman, supra note 151, at 81–82; see also Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754. Northpointe has 
identified eight norm subgroups: “(1) male prison/parole, (2) male jail, (3) male probation, (4) male 
composite, (5) female prison/parole, (6) female jail, (7) female probation, and (8) female composite.” 
Freeman, supra note 151, at 81 (quoting NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 11 
(2015), http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core-
_031915.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGZ2-ZVAV]). 
 155 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761 (“[Northpointe] does not disclose how the risk scores are 
determined or how the factors are weighed.”); Chiel, supra note 144 (“The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
doesn’t care that the software is considered a proprietary trade secret, because the program’s 
‘Practitioner Guide’ includes some of the types of data that are part of the assessment . . . . In other 
words, what’s relevant according to the court is knowing what goes in, not how it’s weighted.”). 
 156 See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761; Freeman, supra note 151, at 80 (describing the survey). 
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created and distributes COMPAS, claims that COMPAS is proprietary and 
a trade secret.157 As in cases involving TrueAllele, the Intoxilyzer, and 
Harris’s family of stingray technology, trade secret assertion obscures 
significant information about how data intended to inform criminal justice 
processes has been generated. 
That secrecy affects not only defendants and their counsel but also the 
courts whose sentences COMPAS scores may inform. Northpointe’s 
assertion of trade secret protection has left each of these criminal justice 
participants similarly in the dark. As one judge observed in Loomis’s case, 
“this court’s lack of understanding of COMPAS was a significant problem 
in the instant case. At oral argument, the court repeatedly questioned both 
the State’s and defendant’s counsel about how COMPAS works. Few 
answers were available.”158 
Northpointe’s secrecy may be of further concern, as COMPAS’s use 
in cases like Loomis’s applies the software beyond its intended use. 
COMPAS was originally designed to aid the Department of Corrections in 
making placement decisions, managing offenders, and planning 
treatment.159 The pre-sentence report in Loomis’s case specifically 
instructed, “risk scores are not intended to determine the severity of the 
sentence or whether an offender is incarcerated.”160 Yet, as Loomis’s case 
illustrates, judges have based a sentence of imprisonment, or the length of 
such a sentence, at least in part on the scores that COMPAS generates. 
To be sure, the use of data and algorithms in sentencing may not 
always be problematic. Draft revisions to the Model Penal Code, for 
instance, “encourage[e] the use of actuarial risk-assessment tools at 
sentencing.”161 Indeed, algorithmic tools may “offer better predictions of 
future behavior than the clinical judgments of treatment professionals such 
as psychiatrists and psychologists, or the intuitions of criminal-justice 
professionals such as judges and probation officers.”162 
But better predictions are only possible if such tools are, as the 
revisions note, “well-designed.”163 Unfortunately, there may be good reason 
 
 157 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761(“Northpointe, Inc., the developer of COMPAS, considers 
COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade secret.”). 
 158 Id. at 774 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
 159 Id. at 754 (citing NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 1 (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technicaldocuments/Practitioners–Guide–COMPAS–Core–
031915.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGZ2-ZVAV]). 
 160 Id. at 755 (emphasis omitted). 
 161 MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.03 (Tentative Draft No. 3 2014) (summarizing MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 6B:09(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2 2011)). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
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to question COMPAS’s design. Emerging evidence indicates that 
COMPAS is racially biased, generating higher recidivism scores for blacks 
than for similarly situated whites.164 In one recent study, ProPublica authors 
analyzed the COMPAS scores for more than 7,000 people arrested in 2013 
and 2014, comparing these scores to the actual incidence of recidivism for 
those individuals.165 The authors concluded that COMPAS scores were 
unreliable predictors of violent crime in particular: “Only 20 percent of the 
people predicted to commit violent crimes actually went on to do so.”166 
Perhaps more troubling, “[t]he formula was particularly likely to falsely 
flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way 
at almost twice the rate as white defendants,” while “[w]hite defendants 
were mislabeled as low risk more often than black defendants.”167 
Determining how these algorithmic disparities arise is difficult.168 It is 
impossible to do so when the formula that undergirds that disparity is 
hidden from view. Yet that is precisely what Northpointe’s assertion of 
trade secret protection does. 
II. THE HARMS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECRECY 
Reliance on trade secrecy in the development of criminal justice tools 
imposes real harms on the criminal justice process. Those harms are of both 
practical and potentially constitutional dimensions. This Part first explains 
why access to source code is often essential to confirm the validity and 
reliability of criminal justice technologies—and why alternative 
mechanisms for ensuring these features are likely to fall short in this arena. 
It next identifies two additional practical harms of reliance on trade secrecy 
in this arena: diminished public confidence in algorithmic quality and less 
innovation to create better algorithms. Finally, this Part briefly explores the 
constitutional costs of criminal justice secrecy. 
A. The Importance of Access to Code 
Source code secrecy surrounding criminal justice algorithms imposes 
significant practical harms on the criminal justice system. Chief among 
 
 164 See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 763 (“[T]here is concern that risk assessment tools may 
disproportionately classify minority offenders as higher risk, often due to factors that may be outside 
their control, such as familial background and education.”); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-
criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/KL7Q-FL25]. 
 165 Angwin et al., supra note 164. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 At a minimum, Angwin and other authors concluded that this disparity was not due to 
“defendants’ prior crimes or the type of crimes they were arrested for.” Id. 
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these is that such secrecy may give rise to worse algorithms by impeding 
effective oversight of the validity and reliability of these tools. 
Secret code is often less good code. Outside experts repeatedly have 
identified algorithmic weaknesses and outright errors in proprietary source 
code revealed in litigation. For instance, outside expert review of the source 
code of New York City’s FST concluded that “the correctness of the 
behavior of the FST software should be seriously questioned.”169 Similarly, 
access to the source code for an Intoxilyzer model in use in Minnesota 
revealed that a “deficient sample” report could indicate a software 
failure.170 Based on that information, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
affirmed the categorical exclusion of such reports, absent other evidence 
indicating that a software error was not at fault.171 When source code 
review of Draeger’s Alcotest device in New Jersey revealed that 
catastrophic error detection was disabled, the state supreme court required 
its correction.172 Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court required other 
firmware changes, including that only the manufacturer be able to alter the 
device software and excluding state “coordinators.”173 
More broadly, research indicates that open-source software—software 
whose source code is freely available to anyone—has fewer errors than 
proprietary software.174 “[P]ublic access to open source codes” thus 
 
 169 See Kirchner, supra note 112. Relatedly, a partial inspection of the source code of STRmix, 
another popular probabilistic genotyping program, revealed a “minor miscode”—one that affected the 
reported likelihood of a DNA match in at least sixty cases. David Murray, Queensland Authorities 
Confirm ‘Miscode’ Affects DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases, THE COURIER-MAIL (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/queensland-authorities-confirm-miscode-affects-dna-
evidence-in-criminal-cases/news-story/833c580d3f1c59039efd1a2ef55af92b [https://perma.cc/SA2X-
85LF]; see also Chessman, supra note 16, at 188–89 (discussing this case); Rebecca Wexler, Convicted 
by Code, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/10/06/
defendants_should_be_able_to_inspect_software_code_used_in_forensics.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z37Q-UHVU] (“Coding errors have been found to alter DNA likelihood ratios by a 
factor of 10, causing prosecutors in Australia to replace 24 expert witness statements in criminal 
cases.”). 
 170 See In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 525, 543 
(Minn. 2012). 
 171 Id. 
 172 See State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 159 (N.J. 2008) (“[W]e direct that the State arrange to have 
the software corrected to re-enable the catastrophic error detection feature.”). 
 173 Id. at 160–61. 
 174 See SYNOPSYS, INC., COVERITY® SCAN OPEN SOURCE REPORT 2014, at 4 (2015), 
http://go.coverity.com/rs/157-LQW-289/images/2014-Coverity-Scan-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M7GU-RUQB] (reporting that “[o]pen source software has a considerably lower 
defect density than commercial software”); Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Coverity Finds Open Source 
Software Quality Better than Proprietary Code, ZDNET (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/article/
coverity-finds-open-source-software-quality-better-than-proprietary-code [perma.cc/R9CY-V2Q7] 
(discussing Coverity’s 2013 report). 
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“facilitates further investigation and validation of technology.”175 Thus, 
access to source code is often essential for defendants to verify that the 
algorithms that have led to their arrest, conviction, or sentence operate as 
intended. 
Other mechanisms intended to ensure the accuracy, validity, and 
reliability of criminal justice algorithms fall short in the absence of outside 
source code review.176 For instance, one group of authors has counseled 
reliance on validation studies to ensure accuracy and fairness.177 Validation 
studies are empirical tests designed to establish that the software or device 
functions as claimed.178 For these scholars, “it is significantly less important 
for judges to pry open this black box than it is for them to establish whether 
its operation has been tested under conditions similar to those at issue in 
court.”179 
But reliance on validation studies in place of source code access, 
rather than alongside it, is likely insufficient to verify that software has 
performed as its designer claims. In part, this stems from the limited 
verification that can be gleaned from “black-box testing”—testing that 
“considers only the inputs and outputs of a system or component.”180 As 
technologists have explained, “[c]omputer scientists . . . have shown that 
black-box evaluation of systems is the least powerful of a set of available 
methods for understanding and verifying system behavior.”181 More 
powerful and effective is “white-box testing,” in which “the person doing a 
test can see the system’s code and uses that knowledge to more effectively 
search for bugs.”182 Accordingly, researchers have concluded that, to enable 
 
 175 Freeman, supra note 151, at 102. 
 176 In some instances, like the use of a stingray device to locate and arrest an individual, concerns 
are less about accuracy and reliability than about privacy. Moreover, concerns about nondisclosure of 
stingray use even to the judges themselves are orthogonal to the accuracy and reliability issues 
discussed in here. For more on these concerns, see infra Section II.B. Where a prosecutor seeks to 
introduce at trial information generated by a stingray device, however, the same concerns about the 
accuracy, reliability, and fairness of the source code at issue may arise. See infra note 216. 
 177 See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 120 (concluding that it is “correct—sometimes” that “a 
review of available validation studies allows an opponent to determine whether a computer program 
contains deficiencies without access to the source code” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jennifer 
Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the Validity of Forensic Science, 
5 EPISTEME 343, 344–45 (2008) (arguing that, for admissibility, the “inquiry should focus first and 
foremost on validation—or, more precisely, on the extent to which appropriate empirical testing 
supports the claims made by the expert—rather than on whether the expert (or, more broadly, the 
community of experts) can offer a plausible account of the underlying mechanism at work”). 
 178 See Mnookin, supra note 177, at 344. 
 179 Id. at 344–45. 
 180 Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. 633, 650 (2017). 
 181 Id. at 661. 
 182 Id. 
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effective scientific inquiry, “anything less than the release of source 
programs is intolerable for results that depend on computation.”183 
The limitations on the insight gleaned from validation testing are 
exacerbated in the criminal justice arena by the nature of the validation 
studies on which software developers have principally relied. Many of 
these validation studies are the product of in-house testing. Of the journal 
articles touted on Cybergenetics’s website, all but two include Perlin—
TrueAllele’s creator and Cybergenetics’s Chief Scientific and Executive 
Officer—as an author.184 Similarly, Northpointe’s own employees 
conducted most of the validation studies on which Northpointe has relied in 
advocating for COMPAS’s accuracy.185 By contrast, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, in its report on forensic 
science in criminal courts, recommended that “[a]ppropriate evaluation of 
the proposed methods should consist of studies by multiple groups, not 
associated with the software developers.”186 
Moreover, existing validation studies are often the product of 
“idealized conditions unrepresentative of the challenges of real 
casework.”187 For example, advanced algorithmic tools, like probabilistic 
genotyping software, are most likely to be called upon “in cases involving 
less-than-ideal conditions—degraded or highly complex mixtures difficult 
for human analysts to interpret.”188 Thus, validation studies are not a viable 
alternative to outside source code review for ensuring reliability and 
accountability; rather, validation alongside outside source code review is 
needed. 
Building accountability into digital design also is unlikely to be a 
practical solution to ensuring accuracy and reliability in the absence of 
outside source code review—at the very least with respect to privately 
developed technologies already in use. Proponents of accountability by 
design argue that, rather than merely disclose source code for outside 
 
 183 Darrel C. Ince et al., The Case for Open Computer Programs, 482 NATURE 485, 485 (2012). 
 184 See CYBERGENETICS, Publications, https://www.cybgen.com/information/publication/
page.shtml [http://perma.cc/3YYH-Z8Y9]. 
 185 See Freeman, supra note 151, at 82–83. 
 186 PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 79. Accordingly, many current validation studies may fail to 
satisfy even those scholars most predisposed to accept them, as even those who would accept validation 
studies alone correctly note that such acceptance is a function of the studies’ quality. See Imwinkelried, 
supra note 8, at 120. 
 187 Roth, supra note 20, at 2033. 
 188 Id. at 1982. Even scholars who are inclined, in principle, to support refusals to disclose source 
code for criminal justice algorithms recognize that disclosure becomes more necessary as “the test 
conditions and the conditions in the instant case” increasingly diverge. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 
120; see also id. at 123–24 (proposing a “range of validation” for assessing the sufficiency of validation 
studies). 
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review, software designers should “publish[] commitments and us[e] zero-
knowledge proofs to ensure that commitments correspond to the system’s 
decisionmaking actions.”189 For these technologists, neither source code 
transparency nor validation studies are sufficient to ensure accuracy and 
fairness.190 Designing for accountability, by contrast, “can enable 
stakeholders to reach accountability goals that could not be achieved by 
imposing new transparency requirements on existing system designs.”191 
But while designing for accountability might be a worthy aspiration, it 
is unlikely to mitigate the need for source code access in the near or 
medium term. There is little evidence that existing tools have adopted such 
measures. More stubbornly, there is often a lack of consensus about what 
decision-guiding properties criminal justice algorithms ought to adopt. For 
instance, as set forth above, scientists and software developers have yet to 
reach agreement about which mathematical model best resolves complex 
DNA mixtures.192 Defining a usable principle of “fairness” in sentencing is 
likely to be every bit as challenging, if not more so.193 Thus, it is far from 
clear that designing for accountability is a practical solution, particularly 
for tools already in use like stingrays, the Intoxilyzer, TrueAllele, and 
COMPAS. 
Significantly, even the technologists who eschew calls for source code 
transparency ultimately make one themselves. In their final conclusions, 
these authors recommend that policymakers “incentivize nongovernmental 
actors to use” techniques of designing for accountability.194 The stick for 
not doing so? “[R]equiring transparency—at least to courts—of code and 
inputs if they do not employ such technical tools.”195 In other words, 
outside access to source code is and remains a key component of ensuring 
the accuracy, validity, and reliability of criminal justice algorithms. 
 
 189 Kroll et al., supra note 180, at 682. “A zero-knowledge proof is a cryptographic tool that allows 
a decisionmaker, as part of a cryptographic commitment, to prove that the decision policy that was 
actually used (or the particular decision reached in a certain case) has a certain property, but without 
having to reveal either how that property is known or what the decision policy actually is.” Id. at 668. 
 190 Id. at 646–53; see id. at 657–60 (2017) (discussing “Transparency and Its Limits” and 
describing “transparency of the source code as well as inputs and outputs for the relevant decisions” as 
a “naive solution to the problem of verifying procedural regularity”). 
 191 Id. at 637. 
 192 See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
 193 See Kroll et al., supra note 189, at 696. 
 194 Id. at 705. 
 195 Id. 
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B. Other Practical Harms of Criminal Justice Secrecy 
In addition to undermining the overall quality of code, shielding 
source code from outside scrutiny may also inflict other practical harms on 
the criminal justice system. For one thing, source code secrecy can 
undermine public confidence in that quality. A lack of confidence is 
understandable; in recent years, outside review has exposed numerous 
previously well-regarded forensic sciences as unreliable or scientifically 
unsound.196 Forensic arson investigation, bite mark analysis, bullet lead 
examination, hair analysis, and even fingerprint analysis have been 
criticized or even discontinued in light of a lack of scientific evidence or 
reliability.197 It is similarly unclear whether recidivism risk statistics spring 
from a scientifically sound basis.198 And there is little reason to believe that 
new methods of breath or DNA analysis, though originating from sound 
science, are free from methodological or coding error. 
Insofar as access to source code is significant in assuring the validity 
and reliability of such analyses—and it is199—lack of access to source code 
may reasonably undermine public and judicial confidence in these criminal 
justice tools. By contrast, source code access can increase judicial and 
public confidence in otherwise abstruse technology. When the New Jersey 
Supreme Court approved continued use of the state’s alcohol breath test 
devices following full review of the device’s source code, the court 
emphasized that its “evaluation of the exhaustive record relating to the 
source code leaves us confident that its errors have been revealed.”200 
Finally, lack of source code access may inhibit innovation of better 
software and other criminal justice tools. As a general matter, when it 
comes to incentives for innovation, American law has typically preferred 
information-forcing policies, like patents, over information-shielding ones, 
like trade secrecy.201 Among other benefits provided by information-forcing 
 
 196 See NAS REPORT, supra note 115, at 8 (“[T]here is a notable dearth of peer-reviewed, 
published studies establishing the scientific bases and validity of many forensic methods.”); Ram, supra 
note 114, at 427. 
 197 Ram, supra note 114, at 427–28 (summarizing the state of forensic science). 
 198 See Angwin et al., supra note 164 (finding that risk scores “proved remarkably unreliable in 
forecasting violent crime: Only 20 percent of the people predicted to commit violent crimes actually 
went on to do so”). 
 199 See supra Section II.A. 
 200 State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 151, 160 (N.J. 2008). 
 201 See Price, supra note 23, at 1779–80. The disclosure requirement for patents, compared with the 
secrecy required for trade secret protection, is not the only way in which patent and trade secret law 
differ. See id. at 1774–83; infra Section III.A. Indeed, scholars debate whether disclosure can justify the 
monopoly rights that the patent system creates. Compare Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 542 (2009) (arguing for the “centrality in the patent system” of disclosure), with 
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 745 (2012) (“Disclosure 
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policies, disclosure is thought to spur follow-on innovation.202 Far less 
innovation can flow from secret information, like the proprietary source 
code that Harris, CMI, Cybergenetics, and Northpointe are at pains to 
protect. Thus, criminal justice secrecy not only inhibits a defendant from 
ensuring that he is not wrongly identified, convicted, or sentenced; it may 
“prevent[] the technology from potentially advancing.”203 
In sum, lack of access to source code yields lower quality code, lower 
confidence in that code, and less follow-on innovation to create better code. 
C. Constitutional Concerns About Criminal Justice Secrecy 
Trade secret assertion in the context of criminal justice tools also 
raises constitutional concerns. Secrecy surrounding the existence, use, and 
function of criminal justice tools interferes with defendants’ and courts’ 
efforts to ensure that the government does not engage in unreasonable 
searches. Such secrecy is also at least in tension with, if not in violation of, 
defendants’ ability to vindicate their due process interests throughout the 
criminal justice process, as well as their confrontation rights at trial. A 
comprehensive constitutional argument, much less a series of them, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Indeed, each of these constitutional 
concerns could occupy an entire article.204 For present purposes, it is 
enough to conclude that trade secrecy here treads close to significant 
constitutional principles, such that, all else being equal, less trade secrecy 
would be better. 
1. Fourth Amendment Concerns 
As an initial matter, the undisclosed use of stingray devices in 
criminal investigations raises concerns under the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.205 As Kerron 
Andrews’s case demonstrates, pursuant to nondisclosure agreements, law 
enforcement officers have intentionally concealed their use of stingray 
 
theory cannot . . . support the modern patent system.”). On the availability (or lack thereof) of patent 
protection for software algorithms, see infra Section III.A. 
 202 Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 112. This, too, is a subject of scholarly debate and criticism. See Price, supra 
note 23, at 1781–83; Benjamin N. Roin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack 
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2017–23 (2005). 
 203 Freeman, supra note 151, at 103. 
 204 Cf. Roth, supra note 20, at 2040 (“briefly” addressing the Confrontation Clause and criminal 
justice algorithms, while observing that separate Article-length treatment is warranted). 
 205 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment does not require a state to obtain a warrant 
before compelling an individual to submit to an alcohol breath test. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 
136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016) (concluding that a warrant is not required to conduct an alcohol breath 
test, which “may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving”). 
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devices not only from defendants and defense counsel but also from 
courts.206 Rather than disclose their intent to use a stingray device, police in 
Andrews’s case sought authorization for a pen register, which imposes 
different and less stringent requirements than those for a warrant.207 But as 
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded, a stingray is 
meaningfully different and more invasive than a pen register, and thus a 
warrant was required.208 The court expressed particular concern that police 
obfuscated their true intent in seeking authorization for a pen register while 
intending to deploy the more invasive stingray device.209 
In that case, secrecy was not itself a constitutional violation; rather, 
secrecy created circumstances in which a constitutional violation might 
escape review because it is hidden from view. As the court emphasized, the 
secrecy required under the Baltimore police department’s nondisclosure 
agreement “prevents the court from exercising its fundamental duties under 
the Constitution.”210 The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be 
“reasonable” calls for balancing an individual’s right to personal security 
against the public interest.211 Nondisclosure agreements, driven by 
assertions of trade secrecy, “obstruct[] the court’s ability to make the 
necessary constitutional appraisal” by preventing law enforcement officers 
from revealing significant information about “the functionality of the 
surveillance device and the range of information potentially revealed by its 
use.”212 
2. Due Process Concerns 
Moving beyond the investigative uses of trade secret-protected 
technologies, the use of such technologies to generate evidence admissible 
at trial also generates tensions with the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. These constitutional provisions guarantee to 
every individual the right to “due process of law.”213 The Supreme Court 
has explained that this guarantee affords “criminal defendants ‘a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”214 This right 
 
 206 State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 329 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 
 207 Id. at 354, 360. 
 208 Id. at 327, 360. 
 209 Id. at 360 (“[W]e are troubled that the application for a pen register\trap & trace order did not 
fully apprise the circuit court judge from whom it was sought of the information that it would yield.”). 
 210 Id. at 338. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 214 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 
485 (1984)). 
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encompasses a defendant’s ability to impeach witnesses and evidence that 
the state may introduce against him.215 Where that evidence results from the 
use of stingray216 or breath test devices, or from analysis by probabilistic 
genotyping software, the surest and perhaps only way to thoroughly cross 
examine such evidence may be by reviewing the source code of that 
criminal justice tool.217 Indeed, at least one federal judge has recognized the 
essential role of adequate discovery of forensic science tools in ensuring a 
fair trial.218 In a letter resigning from the National Commission on Forensic 
Science, Judge Jed Rakoff explained, “if an adversary does not know in 
advance sufficient information about the forensic expert and the 
methodological and evidentiary bases for that expert’s opinions, the 
testimony of the expert is nothing more than trial by ambush.”219 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the “accused does 
not have an unfettered right to offer evidence that is . . . privileged.”220 But 
the Court has also, in significant circumstances, disregarded assertions of 
privilege in vindicating due process principles.221 In ordering the President 
of the United States to turn over secret White House recordings, the 
Supreme Court explained that allowing the President to “withhold evidence 
that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial” based on the President’s 
 
 215 Cf. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (explaining that the government’s obligations 
under Brady “encompass[] impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence”); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (recognizing that, under the Due Process Clause, prosecutors have a 
constitutional obligation to preserve and give to a defendant material evidence pertinent to his defense). 
 216 Although the typical use of a stingray device implicates the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, see supra notes 205–212, due process principles would be 
implicated if the government sought to introduce information generated by a stingray device into 
evidence for its truth. For instance, if the government sought to use stingray-generated information 
placing the defendant at a particular location at a particular time to establish the defendant’s location as 
a matter of fact, this would implicate the defendant’s trial rights. Such use might also implicate the 
Confrontation Clause, for the reasons discussed infra, notes 237–253. 
 217 See supra Section II.A. 
 218 See Jed S. Rakoff, Full Text: Judge’s Protest Resignation Letter, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/full-text-judges-protest-resignation-letter/2015/01/29/41659da6-
a7e1-11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html [https://perma.cc/RJP5-U863]. 
 219 Id. Judge Rakoff resigned from the Commission after he was informed that “the subject of pre-
trial forensic discovery—i.e., the extent to which information regarding forensic science experts and 
their data, opinions, methodologies, etc., should be disclosed before they testify in court—is beyond the 
‘scope’ of the Commission’s business and therefore cannot properly be the subject of Commission 
reports or discussions in any respect.” Id. Shortly after this resignation, the U.S. Department of Justice 
reversed that determination as to the scope of the Commission’s work, and Judge Rakoff rejoined the 
Commission. Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Rakoff Returns to Forensic Panel After Justice Department Backs 
Off Decision, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/in-reversal-
doj-lets-forensic-panel-suggest-trial-rule-changes-after-us-judge-protests/2015/01/30/2f031d9e-a89c-
11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html [https://perma.cc/5UC8-PG54]. 
 220 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 221 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974). 
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asserted need for confidentiality in presidential communications “would cut 
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the 
basic function of the courts.”222 Of course, in Nixon, it was the prosecutor 
who sought to compel disclosure of third-party privileged material.223 But 
insofar as the Court in Nixon prioritized general due process principles over 
confidentiality, its conclusion must be all the more compelling where the 
specific constitutional criminal defense protections are at issue. Thus, 
“when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought 
for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in 
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due 
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.”224 
Moreover, even if a defendant’s due process right to present a defense 
is insufficient to directly vindicate a defendant’s request for source code 
access, that right makes plain the harms of trade secrecy in the criminal 
justice context. Absent an assertion of trade secret protection, a defendant 
would likely be able to access the source code necessary to present his 
defense.225 It is the assertion of trade secret protection that threatens the 
defendant’s right to present a defense, regardless of whether the due 
process clause would itself vindicate that right by surmounting the 
assertion of trade secrecy. 
The Due Process Clause also establishes minimum fairness standards 
for sentencing.226 The Supreme Court has made clear that due process 
guards against sentencing based on “materially false” information that a 
defendant has no effective “opportunity to correct.”227 The Court has 
similarly suggested that sentencing a defendant “on the basis of 
confidential information which is not disclosed to the defendant or his 
counsel” can run afoul of due process.228 In Gardner, a plurality opinion 
concluded that due process will not abide a sentence “imposed, at least in 
 
 222 Id. at 712. 
 223 Id. at 686. 
 224 Id. at 713. 
 225 In some instances, independent bases for continued secrecy may exist. For a discussion of these 
alternative bases for nondisclosure and their prospects for success, see infra notes 401–404 and 
accompanying text. 
 226 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he sentencing process, as 
well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”); see Townsend v. 
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (invalidating a sentence because proceedings lacked due process). 
 227 Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741. 
 228 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358. 
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part, on the basis of information which [the defendant] had no opportunity 
to deny or explain.”229 
In challenging Wisconsin’s use of COMPAS in sentencing, Eric 
Loomis invoked Gardner to argue that shielding COMPAS’s formula for 
weighting and calculating recidivism risk scores leads to sentences based, 
at least in part, on information a defendant has no “opportunity to correct” 
and “no opportunity to deny or explain.”230 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, concluding that disclosure of—and opportunity to 
correct, deny, or explain—the questions and answers entered into 
COMPAS largely suffices.231 
But this misses the point. Although Northpointe discloses the 
informational input for its program, that is no guarantee that the scores that 
it produces based on its proprietary weighting of that information are valid. 
Due process is intended to ensure that a sentence derives from accurate 
facts. If a sentence is based, even in part, on a recidivism risk score 
determined by an unsound algorithm, that amounts to a sentence based on 
an inaccurate fact. The inability to ascertain the validity or reliability of the 
methodology underlying COMPAS’s recidivism risk scores thus runs 
counter to this due process principle. As no less an authority than the 
Solicitor General of the United States has conceded, “a court’s use of a risk 
assessment based on an undisclosed scoring methodology creates at least 
the possibility not only of scoring error, but of a flawed actuarial approach 
that a defendant cannot effectively counter through other types of 
evidence.”232 Indeed, the Solicitor General acknowledged that “[s]ome uses 
of an undisclosed risk-assessment algorithm might raise due process 
concerns.”233 For instance, were recidivism risk scores made a “part of a 
sentencing ‘matrix’” or deemed to “establish a ‘presumptive’ term of 
imprisonment,” this might well run afoul of the Due Process Clause.234 
 
 229 Id. at 362; see State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(2017). Though the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held explicitly that Gardner’s reasoning applies 
beyond capital cases, see State v. Skaff, 447 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not, see O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 162 (1997) (confining Gardner to a case 
concerned with Eighth Amendment limits in capital cases). But see id. at 173–75 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the O’Dell majority as misreading Gardner and later cases accepting Gardner’s 
due process rationale). 
 230 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761. 
 231 Id. at 761. 
 232 U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *17. 
 233 Id. at *18. 
 234 Id. The Solicitor General argued that Loomis’s case did not present such concerns because, 
among other things, the sentence in that case “was not based—even in part—on undisclosed 
information.” Id. at *15. That is, the Solicitor General argued that Loomis’s sentence was not based, 
even in part, on the COMPAS scores appearing in his presentence report. This is a questionable reading 
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Once again, it is the assertion of trade secrecy that presses on this due 
process norm. As the Solicitor General observed in his brief, several states 
have avoided this due process difficulty “by developing and validating 
publicly available risk-assessment measures for consideration at 
sentencing.”235 That is, but for the assertion of source code secrecy, this due 
process concern would not arise. 
3. Confrontation Concerns 
Finally, the Constitution operationalizes its concern for fair trial 
procedures through a panoply of Sixth Amendment criminal defense 
rights.236 Of these, the Confrontation Clause has received the most attention 
in this arena.237 The Confrontation Clause affords a criminal defendant the 
right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.”238 In a recent 
article, Professor Andrea Roth argues that “machine sources sometimes 
may, indeed, trigger a right of confrontation.”239 The Supreme Court has 
explained, “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its 
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”240 Roth 
elaborates that a chief danger of such ex parte statements was that they 
were “impressive-looking” but “unconfrontable,” leaving defendants with 
“little chance of disputing them.”241 Unfortunately, “[a]llowing the state to 
build or harness machines to render accusations, without also providing the 
defendant a constitutional right to test the credibility of those machine 
sources, resembles trial by ex parte affidavit.”242 A lab analyst or law 
enforcement officer reports the results of an algorithmic process, like an 
individual reading an ex parte affidavit into evidence.243 That witness 
cannot speak to the underlying accuracy or reliability of the report they 
 
of the sentencing court’s decision. As discussed above, the sentencing court specifically cited Loomis’s 
COMPAS score in imposing its sentence. See Chiel, supra note 144. 
 235 U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *17 n.5. 
 236 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 237 See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 118 (“The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in criminal 
cases, the defendant’s right to attack the weight of the prosecution’s evidence is of constitutional 
dimension under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.”); Roth, supra note 20, at 2040–48 
(“[M]achine sources sometimes may, indeed, trigger a right of confrontation.”); Wexler, supra note 10, 
at 22 (“[S]cientific relevance is a floor not a ceiling to legal relevance.”). The Confrontation Clause 
does not apply at sentencing. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 238 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 239 Roth, supra note 20, at 2040. 
 240 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). 
 241 Roth, supra note 20, at 2041. 
 242 Id. at 2043. 
 243 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
698 
read. And yet that report, like an ex parte affidavit, is surely “impressive-
looking.”244 
On this view, the defendant’s right of confrontation should encompass 
the opportunity to impeach the machine source itself. Cross-examining a 
software developer is not a suitable substitute for examining the software 
source code itself because code will never exactly embody a developer’s 
intent. As discussed above, errors may arise from coding mistakes and 
software rot of which the developer is unaware,245 as well as from 
predictable false positive results.246 Once again, assertions of trade secrecy 
conflict with constitutional principles, here the right of the accused to 
cross-examine his accusers. 
The same result may flow from the Supreme Court’s recent focus on 
“testimonial hearsay” as the key for the confrontation right to apply.247 In 
Crawford v. Washington, the Court defined “testimony” as “[a] solemn 
declaration . . . made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.”248 Pursuant to that definition, the Court has held that a defendant has 
a near-sacrosanct right to cross examine the particular forensic analyst who 
certifies the results of a laboratory process.249 More generally, statements 
are testimonial where they are made in response to police interrogation, 
where “the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”250 
The results produced by criminal justice algorithms fall comfortably 
within the scope of this understanding of “testimonial.” Such results are 
“solemn” and produced “for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.”251 As they arise from law enforcement requests or direct use of 
criminal justice technologies, it makes sense to think of these results as the 
product of a kind of “police interrogation,” the primary purpose of which is 
 
 244 Id. at 2041. 
 245 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text; see also Chessman, supra note 16, at 186–92 
(identifying “structural sources of error” that may unintentionally cause software to be unreliable or 
faulty, including “accidental errors,” “software updates to legacy code,” and “software rot”). 
 246 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 247 For recent cases focusing on the scope of “testimonial hearsay” for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause, see Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 
564 U.S. 647 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 248 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 249 See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 652; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310–11. The Confrontation 
Clause does not apply, however, where an analyst testifies about forensic reports as the basis for an 
expert opinion and does not submit the reports themselves for their truth. Williams, 567 U.S. 50. 
 250 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 251 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
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to inform a criminal investigation and possible prosecution.252 As Roth 
explains, “[i]f the point of targeting solemnity is to capture what is 
particularly abusive about the state purposely relying on impressive but 
unconfronted allegations of crime as a substitute for testimony, then 
machine sources would seem to be squarely implicated.”253 The result is 
that source code should be disclosed for purposes of cross-examination and 
impeachment. When assertions of trade secrecy prevent such disclosure, 
those assertions once again impose constitutional risks, if not outright 
harms. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Assertions of trade secrecy interfere with defendants’ abilities to 
vindicate their due process and confrontation rights at trial and their due 
process interests at sentencing; they also hamstring defendants and courts 
alike in their efforts to ensure that the government does not engage in 
unreasonable searches. Regardless of whether these trade-secret-related 
difficulties rise to the level of independent constitutional violations, they 
make plain that trade secret assertion in the criminal justice context exists 
in tension with bedrock constitutional principles. 
III. THE MANY TOOLS OF INNOVATION POLICY 
In light of established and potential harms of criminal justice 
secrecy—both practical and constitutional—less trade secrecy and less 
deference to asserted trade secret status would be an improvement. Yet 
courts have largely declined to examine vigorously the assertions of trade 
secret protection in these criminal contexts.254 Moreover, in rejecting 
requests for source code access, courts have often deferred to private 
developers’ assertions of dire competitive harm should their asserted trade 
secret be revealed.255 Law enforcement entities have worked hand in glove 
with private developers to shield criminal justice technologies from outside 
scrutiny.256 Some scholars have likewise adopted ominous predictions in 
 
 252 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 253 Roth, supra note 20, at 2048. 
 254 See Wexler, supra note 10, at 40–42 (describing likely instances of over-claiming and abuse in 
private assertions of trade secret protection in the criminal justice context). 
 255 See, e.g., Memorandum Order at 2, Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Feb. 4, 2016) (refusing to order disclosure of TrueAllele’s source code because it “would 
cause irreparable harm to the company, as other companies would be able to copy the code and 
potentially put him out of business”). 
 256 See, e.g., supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text (discussing FBI collaboration with Harris 
to assure stingray secrecy); see supra notes 74–76, 80 and accompanying text (discussing state 
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support of trade secrecy. As one author explains, “[i]f the information is 
publicly circulated and copied, the company can lose licensing revenue. If 
the software in question is one of the company’s most valuable assets, the 
result might be the bankruptcy of the company.”257 
Among other things, these responses reflect concern that, absent trade 
secret protection, developers will be unable to continue and improve upon 
their work. Concern that judicial action may inhibit innovation is laudable. 
After all, well-designed criminal justice algorithms promise a more fair and 
more just criminal justice system. As set forth above, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology described probabilistic 
genotyping as a significant and welcome advance in the science.258 
Similarly, draft revisions to the Model Penal Code explain that “well-
designed actuarial risk-assessment tools offer better predictions of future 
behavior than the clinical judgments of treatment professionals such as 
psychiatrists and psychologists, or the intuitions of criminal-justice 
professionals such as judges and probation officers.”259 
Concern that judicial action may inhibit innovation is also common 
when courts encounter advanced technology. For instance, similar concerns 
pervaded Moore v. Regents of the University of California, in which the 
California Supreme Court famously denied that an individual has any 
property right in cells removed from his body that are used in scientific 
research.260 In reaching that holding, the court opined that recognizing a 
property right in one’s cells would have a chilling effect on socially 
beneficial medical research.261 
Yet, such concern is misplaced when it comes to mediating the 
relationship between private developers of criminal justice algorithms and 
the criminal defendants (and sometimes courts) who wish to examine their 
source code.262 Focusing on the potential costs of breaching trade secret 
protection in fact answers the wrong question. Trade secrecy is but one tool 
 
avoidance of source code possession for alcohol breath test devices); see also infra notes 399–401 and 
accompanying text (acknowledging and discussing alternative bases for continued source code 
nondisclosure, apart from trade secrecy). 
 257 Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 125 (citations omitted). 
 258 PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 79 (“These probabilistic genotyping software programs 
clearly represent a major improvement over purely subjective interpretation.”). 
 259 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.03 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 3 2014). 
 260 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990). 
 261 Id. at 493 (emphasizing the need not to threaten “innocent parties who are engaged in socially 
useful activities” with “disabling civil liability”). 
 262 Existing scholarship, where it tackles trade secrecy in this field at all, treats such secrecy as 
inevitable. Such scholarship accordingly argues for disclosure-forcing mechanisms within the confines 
of existing trade secret and evidence law. See Wexler, supra note 10. This is an important project, but it 
is narrower than the one to which this Article is addressed. 
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of many that the government may deploy to spur innovation. Moreover, 
those tools may be uniquely within the government’s reach in the field of 
criminal justice algorithms because government entities are the primary (or 
sole) purchasers of such technologies.263 
This Part identifies the array of policy mechanisms available for 
incentivizing innovation in the field of criminal justice algorithms. The 
literature on innovation policy is vast,264 and so this Part aims to synthesize 
that literature to identify how these innovation levers differ and which may 
best be applied to spur the development of criminal justice algorithms. 
Some of these levers more easily advance the goal of device and source 
code disclosure. Some are more easily implemented than others in the 
criminal justice context. Some are already in use. Thus, a court’s decision 
to require disclosure sufficient to enable vigorous inspection, testing, and 
validation need not leave innovators without sufficient rewards for their 
work. 
A. Patents and Trade Secrets 
Patents are the traditional foil to trade secrecy.265 Together, patents and 
trade secrecy function as mechanisms of innovation policy that award what 
amounts to a property right to inventors.266 But each form of intellectual 
property offers a different scope of protection and different burdens. 
Only a brief overview of trade secret law is needed to situate 
alternative innovation policy mechanisms by comparison. Trade secret 
protection springs largely from state law, though the basic contours of the 
doctrine are fairly consistent across jurisdictions.267 As set forth above, a 
 
 263 See infra Section IV.A. 
 264 E.g., Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1530–34 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (comparing 
patents, prizes, and grants); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 317–26 (summarizing the literature on 
patents versus prizes versus grants and adding tax incentives to the range of innovation policy levers); 
see also Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–21 (2003) 
(describing a prize alternative to patents); Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 299, 308–09 (2015) (identifying regulatory competitive shelters as an additional tool for spurring 
innovation in highly regulated fields). 
 265 See, e.g., Price, supra note 23, at 1769 (“Inventors face a stark choice between two intellectual 
property systems of protecting innovative ideas: patents and trade secrecy.”); Derek Handova, The 
Business of IP: Choosing Between Patents and Trade Secrets, IP WATCHDOG (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/25/choosing-patents-and-trade-secrets/id=69368 
[https://perma.cc/L25Q-WFQ2] (“Patents and trade secrets represent two of the most common methods 
to protect IP. However, the most astute lawyers know when to favor one over the other.”). 
 266 See Price, supra note 23, at 1775–76. 
 267 Id. at 1776 n.30. Federal law also provides some trade secret protection through the Economic 
Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012), and the recently enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 
Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.). 
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trade secret is information that is “subject to reasonable efforts to maintain 
secrecy and derives independent economic value from its secrecy.”268 Trade 
secret protection depends on continued secrecy; public disclosure is 
anathema to it.269 Indeed, absent public disclosure, a trade secret may 
persist indefinitely. The scope of trade secret protection, however, is quite 
narrow. Trade secret law protects secret information only from its 
misappropriation.270 Legal liability attaches where a person “uses or 
discloses trade secret information in violation of a duty of confidence or 
after acquiring the information by theft or fraud.”271 But trade secret law 
gives no relief where others reverse engineer an innovation or 
independently invent it.272 As the preceding discussion has made evident, 
trade secret holders routinely assert a privilege against disclosure in 
litigation to bar or limit discovery of its protected information. 
Patent law, by contrast, is a creature exclusively of federal law. An 
invention is patentable only if it comprises patentable subject matter and is 
new, useful, and nonobvious.273 Moreover, and most significantly for 
present purposes, patent law requires public disclosure of an invention as a 
condition for obtaining a patent.274 Indeed, “[t]he traditional quid pro quo 
view of the patent system imagines the patent grant as the carrot used to 
entice inventors to reveal their valuable secrets to the public.”275 Disclosure 
is satisfied by “a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
and process of making and using it,” sufficient to enable a person of 
ordinary skill in the art to make and use it as well.276 This disclosure must 
accompany an application for a patent, and such applications typically are 
published eighteen months after the filing date.277 A successful patentee 
gains broad exclusive rights to his invention, including the right to make, 
use, or sell that invention in the United States.278 Unlike a trade secret, 
 
 268 Price, supra note 23, at 1776. 
 269 Id. at 1777. 
 270 Id.; see also Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 244 (1998) (emphasizing trade secret law’s basis in relational 
duties). 
 271 Bone, supra note 270, at 244. 
 272 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmts. 1–2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1985). 
 273 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012). 
 274 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (listing what the inventor must include in the public disclosure). 
 275 J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 919 (2011). Scholars 
debate whether patent law’s disclosure requirements actually facilitate meaningful disclosure. See supra 
note 201. That debate is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 276 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 277 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 122(b) (2012). 
 278 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (covering patent infringement and the inventor’s remedies for 
enforcing exclusivity rights). 
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reverse engineering or independent invention of a patented innovation 
nonetheless constitutes infringement.279 Further, patent protection is time-
limited. Under current law, patent rights expire twenty years after the date 
of the patent application.280 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has devoted considerable attention 
to the scope of patentable subject matter.281 The Court has long held that the 
patentable subject matter provision “contains an important implicit 
exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patentable.”282 Within the last decade, however, the Court has enforced this 
exception with renewed vigor, holding that methods for hedging risk,283 
calibrating drug dosing,284 and mitigating settlement risk each amounted to 
an invalid effort to patent an abstract idea.285 The Supreme Court also held 
that patents on isolated DNA sequences are invalid because such sequences 
are a “product of nature.”286 
Under this line of cases, many criminal justice algorithms might well 
be nonpatentable subject matter. The Court has held that mathematical 
processes are abstract ideas ineligible for patent protection, at least insofar 
as those ideas are not inventively applied some real-world application.287 
Consequently, because computer algorithms are mathematical processes, 
they often cannot be protected with patents. The addition of a physical 
computer on which such an algorithm can run, the Court has emphasized, is 
not enough to render it patentable.288 Rather, to be patent-eligible, an 
invention directed at an abstract idea—such as an algorithm—must include 
an “inventive concept” that “ensure[s] that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”289 Criminal 
justice algorithms like TrueAllele and COMPAS, which are simply 
 
 279 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
37 (2017) (“The patent grant is nearly absolute, barring even those who independently develop the 
invention from practicing its art.”). 
 280 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
 281 See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 
66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 282 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 589 (internal quotation marks and brackets 
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 283 Bilski, 561 U.S. 593. 
 284 Mayo, 566 U.S. 66. 
 285 Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347. 
 286 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 580. 
 287 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 
 288 Id. at 2358 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). 
 289 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73; see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 
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sophisticated software programs, may be particularly susceptible to 
exclusion from patentability.290 
In light of the difficulty of patenting criminal justice algorithms and 
the traditional dichotomy of patents and trade secrets, it is unsurprising that 
many private developers of these algorithms have pursued trade secret 
protection. As set out above, however, the harms flowing from this choice 
are significant.291 Fortunately, patents and trade secrets are not the only 
tools available for incentivizing innovation. 
B. Prizes 
Prizes as a tool to spur innovation have a distinguished pedigree. In 
1714, the British government offered a prize of £20,000 (worth more than 
£1 million today) to the inventor of a method for determining longitude at 
sea.292 More recently, prizes have won renewed interest. In 2014, the British 
government reconvened the Longitude Committee to facilitate a modern 
prize process.293 In the United States, the National Academy of Engineering 
recommended that the federal government invest more extensively in 
certain prize competitions.294 In 2009, the President urged agencies to 
increase their use of prizes as incentives for innovation, and to date, federal 
agencies have offered more than $250 million in more than 803 “challenge 
and prize competitions.”295 These competitions include prizes for 
“develop[ing] algorithms that advance place-based crime forecasting,”296 
 
 290 Cybergenetics, which created and sells TrueAllele, lists several TrueAllele patents on its 
website. Patents, CYBERGENETICS, https://www.cybgen.com/information/patents.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/FG5L-Q9CB]. All of these patents claim methods or systems related to genetic 
analysis. See id. All but two, however, were issued well before the Supreme Court’s renewed focus on 
patentable subject matter. See id.; U.S. Patent No. 8,898,021 (filed Feb. 2, 2001) (issued Nov. 25, 
2014); U.S. Patent No. 9,708,642 (filed Nov. 20, 2014) (issued July 18, 2017). Sophisticated criminal 
justice algorithms may also face patenting difficulties for written description and enablement reasons. 
See W. Nicholson Price II, Describing Black-Box Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 347, 348, 351–
52 (2015) (concluding that satisfying the written description and enablement requirements is difficult, 
but not insurmountable, for “black-box” medicine, and defining “black-box” medicine as medically 
related algorithms that are opaque because they are so complex as to be “practically nontransparent” or 
because they are the product of machine learning). 
 291 See supra Part II. 
 292 See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 32 (2004); Martin Rees, A Longitude 
Prize for the Twenty-First Century, 509 NATURE 401, 401 (2014). 
 293 Rees, supra note 292. 
 294 NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, CONCERNING FEDERALLY SPONSORED INDUCEMENT PRIZES IN 
ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE 1 (1999). 
 295 About, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/about [https://perma.cc/6PW2-26R5]; 
Challenges, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/list [https://perma.cc/JFS5-NTLT] (“803 
Competitions Found”). 
 296 Real-Time Crime Forecasting Challenge, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/
challenge/real-time-crime-forecasting-challenge [http://perma.cc/T4JW-S8M7]. 
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determining “the amount and rate of change of the ballistic performance 
of” individual body armor vests,297 and designing “new automated detection 
algorithms . . . that improve the speed, accuracy, and detection of small 
threat objects and other prohibited items during the airport passenger 
screening process.”298 
The prizes best suited for encouraging innovation are inducement 
prizes—those “designed to foster progress toward or achievement of a 
specific objective by offering a named prize or award.”299 Inducement 
prizes typically reward those “who provide the best entry in a contest or 
who first meet some specified technical goal.”300 Governments are not the 
only entities capable of establishing and awarding prizes. Some of the best-
known modern prizes spring from private sources, including the famed 
Ansari XPRIZE, which offered $10 million for a privately financed, 
reusable spacecraft “capable of carrying three people to 100 kilometers 
above the Earth’s surface twice within two weeks.”301 
Unlike patents, which demand public disclosure, or trade secrets, 
which shun public disclosure, prizes are agnostic on the matter of 
disclosure.302 Prizes can condition their rewards on disclosure of the 
winning or participating entrants, though many existing prizes have 
declined to impose such conditions.303 Although prizes typically exist 
alongside traditional intellectual property regimes, some scholars have 
proposed utilizing prizes in place of such regimes.304 These proposals 
largely rely on government-managed prizes.305 
In assessing the comparative virtues and vices of patents and prizes, 
some key differences appear. First, patents differ from many other 
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 300 Id. 
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 304 See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–21 (2003) 
(surveying the literature). 
 305 See id. at 121 (“Prize system advocates recognize that the devil is in the details and that the 
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innovation mechanisms, including prizes, in “who decides which projects 
to reward and how much to reward them.”306 Under the patent system, once 
a patent issues, market forces of supply and demand determine whether and 
how much an innovation is worth through consumer purchases (or lack 
thereof) at supracompetitive prices.307 The same is true for trade secrets. So 
long as trade secrecy is intact, market forces determine what 
supracompetitive price is acceptable.308 By contrast, prize administrators 
typically fix the amount of a prize when the prize is announced, rather than 
when it is awarded, and they bear responsibility for determining when a 
submission has succeeded.309 These differences require a prize giver to 
accurately forecast the value of a potential innovation, as well as the 
difficulties it might face in reaching fruition.310 Prizes accordingly give the 
government, rather than the market, power to determine the amount of the 
economic reward for innovation. 
Second, prizes typically diverge from traditional intellectual property 
doctrines on the matter of who pays the supracompetitive reward for 
innovation. When the government administers a prize, its funds are often 
drawn from general tax revenue.311 Conversely, trade secrets and patents 
extract supracompetitive revenue only from their own consumers.312 They 
thus eschew enlisting the general public in paying for a particular 
innovation and place the burden on the purchasers of IP-protected 
products.313 
Yet these policy differences may not be so significant in the context of 
criminal justice tools. Both of the major policy divides between prizes, on 
the one hand, and patents and trade secrets, on the other, turn on the greater 
role the government typically plays in administering prizes. But in the 
criminal justice context, government entities also dominate the role of “the 
market” that is central to patent and trade secret policy. Tools like 
stingrays, alcohol breath test devices, probabilistic genotyping software 
 
 306 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 327. 
 307 Id. at 327. 
 308 Id. at 346–47 (“Trade secret protection, like patent protection, is an ex post, market-set 
transfer . . . .”). 
 309 Id. at 327. 
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 313 Id. at 346–47. 
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programs, and recidivism risk statistic packages are largely, if not 
exclusively, purchased by government entities, usually law enforcement.314 
It might even be unlawful for a nongovernment actor to procure such 
devices.315 
Prizes might be operationalized in the criminal justice sphere in at 
least two ways. First, discrete technological tools the government is 
interested in developing and using might be the subject of a one-time 
inducement prize. As set forth above, at least one such prize has already 
been offered. The federal government’s Office of Justice Programs issued a 
challenge prize to “develop algorithms that advance place-based crime 
forecasting.”316 Second, law enforcement or judicial procurement offices 
may already functionally be paying prize-like bounties for the criminal 
justice tools they acquire by paying supracompetitive prices.317 In 
particular, exclusive government procurement contracts netting 
supracompetitive profits are quite a significant prize to capture.318 
C. Grants 
Government grants are disbursements of funds that provide direct 
financial support to undertake or complete a project.319 In 2015, total 
federal research and development (R&D) spending exceeded $130 
billion.320 More than half of these funds supported defense-related R&D,321 
 
 314 See infra Section IV.A. 
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tools deployed to investigate, prosecute, or sentence criminals is closer to an ex post prize than an ex 
ante grant. 
 318 See also infra notes 351–353 and accompanying text (discussing exclusive contracts in the 
context of regulatory exclusivities). 
 319 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 320 & n.73. Grants can encompass both funds awarded to 
nongovernment researchers and direct spending in government research laboratories, id. at 320, though 
the former is of primary interest here. 
 320 Michael Yamaner, Total Federal Research and Development Funding Down 1% in FY 2015, 
but Funding for Research Up 1%, INFOBRIEF at 1 (Mar. 2017), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2017/
nsf17316/nsf17316.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HAJ-VADT]. 
 321 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT 217 tbl.9.7 (2016) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-
2016-TAB.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SMJ-EHAM]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
708 
a common birthplace for criminal justice algorithms and other tools.322 
Moreover, state governments also invest significantly in research grants, 
though much of that money is allocated to university research.323 
Grant funding may, but need not, be conditioned on disclosure of the 
fruits of that funding. In general, grant recipients are required to disclose to 
the federal government any patentable inventions arising from grant-funded 
research.324 Grant recipients typically are not required to disclose non-
patentable discoveries—and encouraging such disclosure can be 
challenging.325 This is not to say that more rigorous disclosure requirements 
would be inconsistent with the regulatory framework of grant funding. 
Rather, in the context of criminal justice technologies, grant-making 
agencies might well conclude that a more robust disclosure requirement is 
appropriate. For instance, just as the federal government requires 
communication of patentable inventions “within a reasonable time after 
[such invention] becomes known,” the government might require 
disclosure of grant-supported trade secret information “within a reasonable 
time after” such information is developed.326 
Like prizes, grants allocate to the government both determination of 
the amount of the innovation incentive and the obligation to pay for it, 
usually from general funds.327 But grants differ from prizes, as well as trade 
secrets and patents, because grant funding infuses capital to potential 
innovators before a completed or commercial product is available, rather 
than rewarding successful inventors ex post.328 This earlier distribution of 
 
 322 See, e.g., Jemal R. Brinson, Cell Site Simulators: How Law Enforcement Can Track You, CHI. 
TRIB. (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/plus/ct-cellphone-tracking-devices-
20160129-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/R2KY-Q4RW] (“[Stingray technology] was initially 
developed and used by military and intelligence agencies and over time made its way to state and local 
law enforcement agencies.”). 
 323 See RONDA BRITT, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG’G STATS., UNIVERSITIES REPORT HIGHEST-
EVER R&D SPENDING OF $65 BILLION IN FY 2011, at 2 (2012), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/
nsf13305/nsf13305.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q93V-2TG5]; CHRISTOPHER PECE, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. & 
ENG’G STATS., STATE GOVERNMENT R&D EXPENDITURES TOTAL MORE THAN $2.2 BILLION IN FY 
2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2017/nsf17307/nsf17307.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8D5-
MGAG] (“State government agency expenditures for research and development totaled $2.2 billion in 
[fiscal year] 2015, an increase of 16.9% from FY 2014”). (Noting that, from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal 
year 2011, “[i]nstitution-funded R&D rose by over $500 million to $12.4 billion”). 
 324 35 U.S.C. §§ 201(d)–(e), 202(c)(1) (2012). 
 325 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 356, 356 n.226 (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public 
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored 
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1674–75 (1996)). 
 326 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1). 
 327 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 327, 345. 
 328 See id. at 333, 348. 
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funds may enable more and smaller companies to enter the market, as it 
reduces the private capital investments required for innovation.329 
Grants appear already to be in use to support the development of some 
criminal justice technologies. Mark Perlin, the creator of TrueAllele, was 
the successful recipient of several federal government research grants. 
Between 1997 and 2000, Cybergenetics, Perlin’s company, received four 
grants under the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.330 
At least two of these grants appear directly related to the development of 
TrueAllele.331 Each grant was administered by the Department of Health 
and Human Services.332 
On the whole, however, direct grant funding is likely to be less well 
suited than other innovation policy mechanisms for encouraging innovation 
in criminal justice technologies, particularly for development by private 
companies like the ones now asserting trade secret protection. For one 
thing, grant funding for private sector R&D is simply less common than 
similar funding for R&D at universities or within government itself.333 For 
another, grants in this context may be particularly subject to the 
inefficiencies believed to accompany government-set rewards.334 In 
particular, scholars have frequently critiqued grants as a tool of innovation 
policy because grant-funding decisions are believed to rely on “decision-
making by centralized government bureaucrats who often lack market 
actors’ superior knowledge.”335 On this view, grants require the government 
to accurately identify which potential innovations to pursue, determine who 
is most likely to produce viable results, and calculate the value of those 
innovations and the cost of development.336 
 
 329 Id. at 336–39; see also About SBIR, SBIR-STTR: AMERICA’S SEED FUND, 
https://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir [https://perma.cc/4N8K-C3C4] (discussing the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program, which “funds the critical startup and development stages” of 
technological innovation at small businesses through “a competitive awards-based program”). 
 330 Cybergenetics Corporation, SBIR-STTR: AMERICA’S SEED FUND, https://www.sbir.gov/
sbirsearch/detail/139893 [https://perma.cc/S785-MFGX]. 
 331 Id. (reciting two grants for “automated microsatellite genotyping”). 
 332 Id. 
 333 University R&D investments, for instance, significantly outpace other state R&D expenditures. 
Compare PECE, supra note 323, at 1 (reciting $2.2 billion in R&D expenditures flowing from state 
government agencies in fiscal year 2015), with BRITT, supra note 323, at 2 (reciting institution-funded 
R&D exceeding $12 billion in fiscal year 2011); see also About SBIR, supra note 329 (explaining that 
federal agencies with large R&D budgets must allocate 3.2% of those funds to the SBIR program). 
 334 See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants 11–18 (Dec. 5, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (summarizing the three primary critiques of grants as a tool of innovation policy: bureaucratic 
decision-making, unaccountable ex ante incentives, and problematic risk allocation between funder and 
grantee). 
 335 Id. at 13; see id. at 13–14. 
 336 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 327. 
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In practice, this critique is somewhat misplaced, at least for many 
traditionally grant-funded fields. For instance, the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), the largest nondefense grant funder of research, often enlists 
outside experts to assist the agency in determining both what areas of 
innovation to fund and which specific projects to fund.337 In so doing, the 
NIH can capture, at least in part, the “special advantage” associated with 
harnessing private information in directing innovation.338 But this 
internalization of outside expertise is likely to be more difficult where 
innovating criminal justice algorithms is at issue. In this field, available 
outside experts are more likely to be for-profit competitors (or other 
government entities), rather than academic colleagues. This is likely to 
heighten the risk of conflicts of interest and make even-handed grant 
evaluation difficult to achieve. 
D. Regulatory Exclusivities 
Regulatory exclusivities are “competitive advantages resulting from 
statutory bars on regulatory action where such action is otherwise 
mandated and would have taken place but for the triggering of the bar.”339 
Such exclusivity arises where a government entity is barred from taking 
some action that would introduce or enhance competition in a product or 
market.340 Government nonaction effectively “shelters” from competition 
the beneficiary of earlier government action, granting that beneficiary a 
competitive advantage, if not a de facto monopoly, in the relevant 
market.341 Regulatory exclusivities arise most frequently under the auspices 
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).342 For instance, under the 
Orphan Drug Act, once the FDA approves a drug product to treat a 
particular “rare disease or condition” (an “orphan condition”),343 it is barred 
from approving another drug for that condition for a period of seven 
years.344 
 
 337 See Price, supra note 334, at 24–25 (discussing the role of outside experts in soliciting 
research—deciding what areas of innovation to fund); id. at 26–28 (discussing the role of outside 
experts in peer review of grant applications—deciding what specific projects and innovators to fund). 
 338 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 327–28 (quoting Brian D. Wright, The Economics of 
Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 703 (1983)). 
 339 Heled, supra note 264, at 305. 
 340 Id. 
 341 Id. 
 342 Id. at 353–54. 
 343 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012) (defining “rare disease or condition”). Well-known 
examples of orphan (that is, rare) diseases include Huntington’s disease and amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis (ALS/Lou Gehrig’s disease). Heled, supra note 264, at 336 n.145. 
 344 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2012); see also Heled, supra note 264, at 302 (discussing the Orphan 
Drug Act). 
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As operationalized in the Orphan Drug Act and similar programs, 
regulatory exclusivities operate as patent-like rewards for innovation.345 
These exclusivities reward completed innovation, with supracompetitive 
prices determined by what amounts to a market monopoly and paid by 
product purchasers, rather than the broader public.346 Unlike patents, 
however, regulatory exclusivities do not, by definition, require public 
disclosures of any kind. The government may impose disclosure demands 
as a condition of exclusivity, of course, because the government sets the 
terms for the creation and awarding of these exclusive rights.347 
Insofar as patent-like protection would be desirable for criminal 
justice algorithms but is unavailable due to difficulties qualifying as 
patentable subject matter,348 regulatory exclusivities may offer a way 
forward. To be sure, during a period of exclusivity, innovation directed at a 
particular way of solving a particular problem may be slowed. But that is a 
consequence of exclusive rights, whether they arise from patent law, FDA 
regulations, or procurement policy. Moreover, robust exclusive rights often 
pair well with robust disclosure requirements, as in patent law,349 
suggesting that regulatory exclusivities in this context may be particularly 
generative. 
Indeed, such exclusivities may already effectively be in place for 
some technologies. For many criminal justice technologies, government 
entities enter into exclusive contracts with a single private company to 
obtain a particular kind of technology. For instance, Mark Perlin, 
TrueAllele’s creator, objected when he learned that the FBI proposed to 
enter into a “sole source contract” to obtain STRmix for probabilistic 
genotyping.350 Northpointe, meanwhile, holds an exclusive contract to 
 
 345 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 345, 359 (2007) (describing FDA exclusivities in the context of pharmaceutical 
technologies as “pseudo-patents”); Heled, supra note 264, at 300 (noting that this mechanism for 
encouraging and rewarding innovation has been described not only as a “regulatory exclusivit[y]” but 
also as a “pseudo-patent exclusivit[y]”); 
 346 See supra text accompanying notes 307–308, 312, 328. 
 347 Requiring or enforcing disclosure may be more difficult in view of the fact that different 
government components are typically responsible for creating and administering regulatory 
exclusivities. These exclusivities arise from statute, but they are typically administered by agencies 
(principally the FDA). See Heled, supra note 264, at 305. If the statutory scheme fails to specify a 
disclosure obligation, the agency may be constrained from imposing one itself. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) 
(2012). 
 348 See supra Section III.A. 
 349 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 279, at 245 (“A patent can be a potent property right. In 
exchange for this grant from the government, an inventor must disclose the workings of his or her 
invention in enough detail to be informative to other people working in the same field.”). 
 350 Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 1. 
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provide the State of Wisconsin with recidivism risk statistics.351 These 
exclusive arrangements might well function like regulatory exclusivities, 
particularly if they carry a minimum term of exclusivity. 
E. Tax Incentives 
The government invests in innovation not only by spending its money 
on grants and prizes but also by granting favorable tax treatment to certain 
R&D activities.352 The two largest existing R&D tax expenditures allow 
taxpayers to expense research and experimental spending and to claim a tax 
credit for certain increases in a taxpayer’s research spending.353 Most states 
also give favorable tax treatment to R&D expenditures.354 A majority of 
these states pattern their R&D tax incentives on their federal counterpart.355 
Nine states, however, employ partially or fully refundable tax credits, 
which permit a company to claim the credit even if it has too little income 
against which to offset that credit.356 
All of these policies provide tax relief tied to expenditures for research 
itself, rather than the results of that research. Accordingly, these tax 
incentives, like grants, reward potential innovators ex ante by permitting 
more capital to stay with innovators.357 Like grants, these tax incentives 
may encourage not only more innovation but also innovation by more 
participants.358 Like patents, trade secrets, and regulatory exclusivities, 
however, tax incentives permit the market to dictate the measure of 
 
 351 Freeman, supra note 151, at 92. 
 352 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 113–32, TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 83–105 (comm. print 2014) (summarizing the 
principle provisions); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 321–26 (same). 
 353 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 352, at 83–105. 
 354 See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, MEMORANDUM: OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT TAX INCENTIVES 5 (2013), http://bit.ly/2tKOpYB [https://perma.cc/KT82-AFXE] 
(“Forty-three states offer some type of R&D specific tax incentive with 16 states offering a business tax 
incentive, 3 states offering a sales tax incentive, and 24 states offering both.”). 
 355 Id. at 6 (“A majority of states (31) use the federal definition of [qualified research expenses] 
from the Internal Revenue Code, Section 41, with a modification to include only expenses incurred 
within the state.”). 
 356 Id. 
 357 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 331–32. 
 358 As Hemel and Ouellette observe, the existing federal R&D tax incentives, and the majority of 
existing state R&D tax incentives, favor well-established corporations because their benefits can be 
realized only if a taxpayer has income to offset. Id. at 337. But the skew towards established companies 
is not an inherent feature of tax incentives for research. See id. Indeed, nine states have enacted 
refundable R&D tax credits, which allow a taxpayer to collect the credit regardless of whether the 
business reports taxable income. Id. 
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financial reward: up to a point, the more an innovator invests in research, 
the greater the tax break.359 
Unfortunately, existing tax incentives for R&D facilitate developer 
secrecy much more than disclosure. Taxpayers who claim an R&D tax 
benefit must maintain records establishing their entitlement to that 
benefit,360 but that hardly constitutes meaningful access for anyone other 
than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Tax return information is 
confidential,361 and so the IRS is severely restricted in its ability to disclose 
supporting paperwork.362 Yet, the contours of existing tax incentives do not 
foreclose disclosure-facilitating amendments or alternatives. Secrecy is not 
inherent in tax incentive policy the way it is in trade secret law. To the 
contrary, tax credits might well be conditioned on certain public 
disclosures.363 As long as the value of the tax credit exceeds any losses due 
to increased competition stemming from disclosure, a rational developer 
should choose disclosure. 
More troubling for the use of tax policy to encourage innovation is the 
fact that, though R&D tax credits are widespread, they are largely 
motivated by concerns other than encouraging innovation.364 Indeed, the 
most common motivation is economic development—new jobs—rather 
than innovation—new knowledge.365 Insofar as incentivizing innovation is 
merely a beneficial secondary effect of tax policy, that policy is unlikely to 
reflect best practices for innovation, like public disclosure, that are 
orthogonal to a policy’s true goal. 
 
*          *          * 
 
A multitude of policy mechanisms are available for incentivizing 
innovation, including in developing criminal justice technology. Trade 
secrecy is merely one innovation policy lever among many. Some of these 
levers, like trade secret protection, increase the likelihood and scope of 
nondisclosure and other forms of secrecy. Others, including patents, prizes, 
grants, regulatory exclusivities, and tax incentives coupled with appropriate 
 
 359 Id. at 328, 333. 
 360 See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.41-4(d) (2016) (recordkeeping requirements for claiming the tax credit 
for increasing research activities). 
 361 See I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2016) (confidentiality of tax return information). 
 362 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 356. 
 363 Id. (“[T]ax credit[s] should be conditioned on public disclosure to the extent that such 
disclosure does not significantly undermine the innovation incentive.”). 
 364 See Chad R. Miller & Brian Richard, The Policy Diffusion of the State R&D Investment Tax 
Credit, 42 STATE & LOCAL GOV’T REV. 22 (2010). 
 365 Id. at 24. 
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disclosure requirements, decrease that likelihood. Together, this panoply of 
policy tools makes plain that alternative mechanisms exist for spurring 
helpful innovation in the criminal justice field without sacrificing the 
practical and constitutional necessities of access to source code. 
IV. INNOVATING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Innovation policy is more than simply intellectual property rights like 
trade secrets and patents. As discussed above, mechanisms for encouraging 
innovation can fund companies doing research or reward companies for the 
successful products of that research. Most of these mechanisms can be 
coupled with a requirement to disclose source code or other relevant 
information beyond the confines of a protective order or nondisclosure 
agreement. This Part accordingly articulates how courts and policymakers 
can best encourage or enforce optimal source code disclosure. It first 
explains that implementing alternative innovation policy mechanisms may 
be particularly efficient and effective in the context of criminal justice 
algorithms because government entities are the primary (or sole) purchasers 
of such technologies. In view of the range of alternative innovation policies 
on which the government can draw, secrecy is not necessary for adequate 
innovation. Indeed, many of the tools of innovation policy are already a 
part of funding the development and purchase of criminal justice 
technology. 
Turning to the mechanics of an appropriate disclosure requirement, 
this Part next argues that, to alleviate the practical and potentially 
constitutional harms of source code secrecy, optimal source code disclosure 
should be both broad and early. Broad disclosure means disclosure that 
reaches beyond the parties in a particular criminal prosecution and may 
include public disclosure. Early disclosure means disclosure that precedes a 
technology’s use in a particular criminal investigation, prosecution, or 
sentencing. Acknowledging that government policymakers are best suited 
to require broad and early disclosure, this Part nonetheless contends that 
courts need not wait for these regulators to act before ordering source code 
disclosure in individual cases. If courts order disclosure, policymakers may 
follow that lead, implementing complementary innovation incentives as 
needed along the way. Indeed, recent experience supports a court-initiated 
movement toward transparency. 
A. Efficient Alternative Innovation Policies 
The government, as both a funder of research and the primary 
purchaser of criminal justice technologies, is uniquely well positioned to 
implement alternative innovation policies in an efficient and effective 
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manner. Innovation policy typically must make choices about whether to 
put pricing power and payment obligations in government hands or users’ 
hands. But for criminal justice algorithms and related tools, these amount to 
much the same thing. Government entities enjoy a monopsony (or at least 
an oligopsony) for many criminal justice algorithms.366 That is, government 
entities are the only (or near only) purchasers of these technologies.367 
Some separation between innovation payor and product purchaser 
may arise where the government entity that purchases technology is not the 
same entity as the one that awarded the developer a prize, grant, or tax 
credit. For instance, the City of Baltimore will bear the costs of innovation 
differently depending on whether the federal government pursues 
innovation policy principally through patents (in which Baltimore will pay 
supracompetitive prices for a product) or prizes (in which the federal 
government will shoulder some of the premium for innovation, yielding 
potentially lower prices to product purchasers). 
But the relatively limited number of possible purchasers for criminal 
justice algorithms—law enforcement, departments of corrections, and 
judicial officers—creates less disjunction between payor and purchaser 
than typically exists. Moreover, when a single government entity (whether 
local, state, or federal) contemplates what innovation policy to adopt to 
facilitate its own acquisition of new tools, it will be both payor and 
purchaser regardless of whether it awards grants or tax credits. This 
multiplies the range of innovation policy levers the government may 
efficiently utilize to calibrate the financial rewards for accurate, reliable, 
and transparent criminal justice tools. 
Moreover, many innovation policy mechanisms are already in place, 
awaiting the addition of a proper disclosure requirement. As suggested 
earlier, government procurement of criminal justice tools resemble—or 
could be made to resemble—prizes or regulatory exclusivities.368 
Government procurement policy can act as both purchase and prize where 
the government is the only authorized buyer. If a government entity exerts 
its monopsony power to extract unusually low prices, it is likely to under-
induce innovation and development in the field. By contrast, if the 
government pays supracompetitive prices, that economic windfall to the 
developer functions as an ex post, government-set prize.369 If government 
 
 366 Monopsony is a market condition in which there is only one buyer but many sellers. See NEVA 
GOODWIN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IN CONTEXT 234 (2014). Oligopsony is a market 
condition in which there are a relatively small number of buyers. Id. at 235. 
 367 See, e.g., Harris Letter, supra note 13, at 1; supra text accompanying notes 314–315. 
 368 See supra text accompanying notes 317, 350–351. 
 369 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 333. 
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purchases are coupled with sole source agreements—agreements to buy a 
particular kind of technology or service from only one supplier—this 
arguably constitutes a form of regulatory exclusivity.370 This too is already 
occurring: Recall that Mark Perlin was particularly aggrieved to be 
excluded from the FBI’s proposal to enter a “sole source contract” to 
purchase probabilistic genotyping software.371 A sole source contract 
granted to a competitor was not merely the loss of one sale for Perlin; it 
was exclusion from a lucrative market.372 
As mentioned above, more traditional innovation mechanisms are also 
already in use, in at least small measure. The federal government 
previously has established formal prizes for innovators in this field, 
including a prize for “develop[ing] algorithms that advance place-based 
crime forecasting.”373 Government grants have also supported work to 
develop criminal justice algorithms. For instance, Perlin received multiple 
grants under the SBIR program, some of which appear to have supported 
TrueAllele’s development.374 
To be sure, vigorous assertions of trade secret protection in this field 
may suggest that existing alternative incentives are not yet adequate to 
obviate the commercial value of secrecy.375 If that is so, these existing 
alternative incentives for innovation offer a framework for recalibrating the 
rewards of innovation to do so. For instance, in exchange for source code 
disclosure, government purchasers might guarantee a higher purchase price 
or longer single source contract term for the successful private developer of 
a criminal justice algorithm or related tool. The federal government, in 
particular, may be well suited to establish new prizes or grants for the 
development of such technologies. The precise details of which alternative 
innovation mechanisms are best deployed—and in what measure—must 
await further experience with innovation in the shadow of adequate 
disclosure requirements. For now, it is enough to appreciate that alternative 
mechanisms for encouraging innovation exist, are already in use in some 
 
 370 See supra text accompanying notes 350–351. 
 371 See Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 1. 
 372 Cf. Heled, supra note 264, at 300–02 (describing regulatory exclusivities as frequently requiring 
a regulator to refrain from approving a second market entrant for a period of time after approving the 
first market participant—thus excluding second comers from the market for a set period of time). 
 373 Real-Time Crime Forecasting Challenge, supra note 296. 
 374 Cybergenetics SBIR grants, supra note 330. 
 375 See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 8, at 101 (“Perlin admitted that no other scientists had seen his 
code or reviewed it directly, and he stood by his refusal to make it available, defending it as a ‘trade 
secret.’”); Ruger, supra note 75 (reporting that CMI initially refused to disclose source code for an 
Intoxilyzer device despite a court order and despite the imposition of more than $500,000 in sanctions 
for that refusal). 
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measure in the criminal justice field, and can be modified as needed to 
achieve independence from secrecy. 
Indeed, in light of the panoply of existing innovation policy 
mechanisms, policymakers might conclude that, even absent trade secrecy, 
these existing benefits are sufficient to spur innovation. Trade secrecy, in 
other words, may simply arrogate a particularly harmful windfall to 
developers. This is not a far-fetched conclusion. For both probabilistic 
genotyping and recidivism risk score software packages, the market already 
includes competitors with publicly available source code.376 Insofar as 
maintaining source code secrecy is unnecessary for either competitive 
success or valuable innovation, requiring government contractors to 
exchange trade secrecy for disclosure may not yield a worrisome lack of 
innovation. 
B. Innovating Optimal Disclosure 
While appropriate innovation policy for criminal justice algorithms 
may avoid typically difficult choices about who pays for innovation due to 
the purchasing role of government entities, policy setting in this field may 
underscore a different kind of policy difference, turning on the scope and 
timing of disclosure. As set forth above, alternative innovation policy 
mechanisms are readily available and may be readily paired with disclosure 
requirements. Apart from patents, however, use of an innovation policy 
tool does not inherently establish the scope and timing of relevant 
disclosure.377 For criminal justice technologies, disclosure that is broad and 
early offers significant advantages over disclosure that is confined to an 
individual criminal case in either scope or timing. 
First, source code disclosure, or disclosure that a criminal justice 
technology is in use, may extend either narrowly or broadly. If narrowly, 
only individuals involved in a particular case would gain access to this 
information. This might arise where a court orders source code disclosure 
subject to a protective order.378 A broader remedy might demand public 
 
 376 See U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *17 n.5 (observing that several states have 
“develop[ed] and validat[ed] publicly available risk-assessment measures for consideration at 
sentencing”); PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 78–79; Roth, supra note 20, at 2019. 
 377 On timing of patent disclosure, see 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012). 
 378 See State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 122–23 (N.J. 2008) (describing the efforts undertaken by the 
courts and parties to examine the source code of the alcohol breath test device at issue while preventing 
broader disclosure of that code); Protective Order Regarding the Confidentiality of the Forensic 
Statistical Tool (FST) Source Code and Related Documents, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CR-
00565 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2016) (putting in place a protective order for FST, which order was 
subsequently vacated in October 2017); Wexler, supra note 10, at 50–53 (arguing that protective orders, 
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disclosure. A court might order source code disclosure absent any 
protective order.379 Conversely, legislatures and agencies setting the terms 
for prizes, grants, regulatory exclusivities, and tax incentives, as well as 
procurement offices preparing purchase agreements, might more easily and 
efficiently condition those awards, rewards, and sales on public 
disclosure.380 
Broad disclosure offers several advantages over narrow disclosure. As 
discussed earlier, outside review of source code has identified algorithmic 
weaknesses and errors on numerous occasions.381 Public access to source 
code facilitates thorough investigation by multiple reviewers, making it 
more likely that errors will be identified and corrected.382 Broad disclosure 
also enables multiple groups, including nonprofit criminal defense 
organizations, to share the financial and other costs of validating a software 
program and examining software updates and software status on an 
ongoing basis.383 Finally, broad disclosure may itself act as an incentive for 
further innovation by providing more material on which new innovation 
can build.384 
 
not nondisclosure, are the appropriate response to assertions of trade secrecy in the context of criminal 
justice algorithms). 
 379 To date, only one court has made public the source code disclosed as part of criminal discovery. 
Order, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CR-00565 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2017); Kirchner, supra note 
112. Note, however, that the software at issue in that case, FST, was not developed by a private 
company but rather by the New York City crime laboratory in the Office of the Chief Medical 
Examiner. Kirchner, supra note 112. Accordingly, public disclosure of this code raises somewhat 
different secrecy and innovation concerns. 
 Indeed, given current experience, it seems unlikely that a court would order source code disclosure 
absent a protective order. This is particularly unlikely if a private developer’s assertion of trade secret 
protection arrives in court with trade secret status intact. For the reasons set out below, courts may have 
greater flexibility to order broad disclosure if other government entities have already secured the 
relevant disclosures by other means (e.g., as a condition of receiving a prize, grant, regulatory 
exclusivity, or tax benefit). See infra text accompanying notes 386–404. In light of the multitude of 
alternative innovation policy mechanisms available in this field, however, courts should be increasingly 
inclined to order at least some source code disclosure where relevant. See Wexler, supra note 10, at 25 
(“[I]ntellectual property should not receive such special treatment.”); cf. 3 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE 
SECRETS LAW § 27:13 (under Florida’s trade secret law, “[s]uch factors as . . . protection afforded by 
copyright and patent laws . . . may guide the court in deciding whether to order disclosure”). 
 380 Cf. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 356 (“[T]he award of a grant, prize, or tax credit 
should be conditioned on public disclosure to the extent that such disclosure does not significantly 
undermine the innovation incentive.”). 
 381 See supra text accompanying notes 166–175. 
 382 Freeman, supra note 151, at 102. 
 383 Broad disclosure coupled with alternative innovation policies may yield additional advantages. 
For instance, at the same time that the government invests in grants to develop new or improved 
criminal justice algorithms, it might pioneer new grants for outside criminal justice organizations to 
examine and validate those algorithms. 
 384 See supra text accompanying notes 201–203. 
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Second, source code disclosure, or disclosure that a criminal justice 
technology is in use, may come at two different times: either when software 
is created or offered for sale, regardless of its acceptance in court; or when 
software is used in a particular case. This choice may be interdependent 
with the scope of disclosure. Early disclosure will likely be broader in 
scope, as it would not arise from a particular prosecution within which 
disclosure could be confined. Indeed, courts have little opportunity to opine 
upon or order preprosecution disclosure because court authority is limited 
to adjudicating the individual cases before the court. Conversely, 
legislatures and agencies establishing and administering innovation 
policies, as well as procurement offices purchasing technology, may 
require disclosure prior to disbursement of a reward like a prize or 
regulatory exclusivity, or following completion of a grant or tax credit-
supported research project. 
Earlier disclosure, like broad disclosure, offers several advantages 
over case-dependent disclosure. By the time a criminal case is underway, 
the government has likely already committed significant resources to 
selecting, buying, and learning how to use a particular piece of technology. 
The costs of responding to a product’s failure of reliability or validity will 
be lower the earlier that failure is brought to light.385 Discovering a 
technology failure in the midst of a criminal case is particularly costly, as 
that failure jeopardizes the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the state’s 
interest in prosecuting law breakers.386 Moreover, earlier disclosure would 
empower courts to order source code disclosure more readily, as developers 
would already have traded trade secret protection for other innovation 
incentives. Thus, disclosure may be most efficient, and efficiently enforced, 
when it is required at the time a developer submits a bid for an exclusive 
government contract,387 requests a necessary preapproval for sale,388 or 
simply solicits sales from the state. 
 
 385 See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 205, 207 (1995) (describing third-degree path dependence, where dependence on initial 
conditions results in an inefficient but avoidable outcome). 
 386 Consider the case of Nick Hillary. In that case, two different probabilistic genotyping software 
programs, TrueAllele and STRmix, returned inconsistent results about whether Hillary’s DNA matched 
DNA recovered from a murder scene. See Wexler, supra note 10, at 23–24. In light of the inconsistent 
test results, the judge excluded the matching result from trial, and Hillary was acquitted. See Roth, 
supra note 20, at 2019–20 (describing the Hillary case). 
 387 See, e.g., Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 1 (noting that the FBI proposed a “sole source contract” 
for probabilistic genotyping software). 
 388 See, e.g., Roth, supra note 20, at 2023 (“In the machine context, states have imposed protocols 
most conspicuously for breath-alcohol tests, requiring that testers use an approved machine . . . .”); 
Patrick, supra note 39 (describing Harris’s efforts to obtain FCC approval to sell stingray devices to 
state and local law enforcement entities). 
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In sum, optimal disclosure would be both broad and early. Like 
optimal innovation policy, optimal disclosure policy is principally the 
province of legislators and regulators, rather than courts. Although courts 
may be well situated to order broad as well as party-limited disclosure, 
courts are not well situated to order early disclosure. As discussed below, 
this does not mean that judicial disclosure decisions are immaterial to 
achieving appropriate innovation policy.389 But it does necessitate that 
optimal standard setting in this field enlist legislatures, agencies, and 
procurement offices in requiring broad and early disclosure as a condition 
of accessing innovation rewards. 
C. Innovation and Judicial Disclosure Decisions 
Although courts cannot command optimal disclosure or institute 
alternative innovation policies directly, they have a crucial role to play in 
bringing about appropriate and effective innovation policy. To date, courts 
have largely been content to defer to assertions of trade secret protection, 
and government entities have been keen to defend those assertions.390 But 
that deference is not unalterable. Adjudicating an assertion of trade secret 
privilege calls for a court to balance a defendant’s need for the privileged 
information against the likely harm from disclosure.391 In making that 
determination, a court may consider whether alternative innovation 
incentives mitigate the risks of disclosure.392 As set forth above, many 
alternative incentives already exist in the field of criminal justice 
algorithms.393 If those alternative measures still come up short, they offer a 
ready roadmap for adapting incentives to achieve innovation without 
incurring the harms of secrecy.394 Accordingly, courts need not wait for 
legislatures to act before ordering source code disclosure. To the contrary, 
courts should be emboldened by the existence of alternative innovation 
policy levers to reject trade secrecy in the first instance. 
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that courts are the best-situated 
institution to initiate source code disclosure. That is so because, in many 
cases, the government entities responsible for supporting and procuring 
criminal justice technologies are not interested in disclosing those 
technologies to anyone. Police departments have obfuscated their use of 
 
 389 See infra Section IV.C. 
 390 See supra Part I. 
 391 See 1 JAGER, supra note 379, § 5:33. 
 392 See id. § 27:13; see also Wexler, supra note 10, at 43–44. 
 393 See supra Section IV.A. 
 394 See id. 
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technologies like stingrays.395 The Baltimore police department declined to 
inform even other Baltimore public officials—including the mayor—about 
its use of persistent aerial surveillance and photography of the city to track 
and solve crimes.396 And some state procurement offices have declined to 
negotiate for any access to source code in purchasing criminal justice 
technology like alcohol breath test devices.397 At a minimum, courts are 
likely to be more interested in disclosure and constitutional assessment of 
these programs than are the government entities already invested in their 
success. Even if these entities evaluate these technologies in good faith, 
they will have “already deemed them valid and reliable according to 
whatever procurement standards apply, and will have weak incentives to 
identify information that could prove otherwise.”398 A court’s refusal to 
defer to an assertion of trade secrecy enables scrutiny of criminal justice 
technology by the institutional participant most motivated to uncover its 
flaws—the defendant. 
Jettisoning trade secrecy nondisclosure in a court proceeding in the 
first instance may yield other benefits as well. In some instances, 
independent bases for continued secrecy may exist. Thus, the government 
might seek to preserve source code secrecy not for trade secret reasons but 
for security reasons. Harris prevailed upon this reasoning in seeking 
nondisclosure about stingray devices from the FTC.399 Law enforcement 
may be concerned that disclosure could enable law breakers or criminal 
defendants to “game” the system or circumvent surveillance technology.400 
Insofar as there are legitimate alternative bases for nondisclosure, a court-
initiated process would enable those alternative bases to be litigated on 
their own terms.401 
 
 395 See State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (describing the state’s 
failure to disclose the use of stingray to locate criminal defendant); see generally Section I.A 
(discussing nondisclosure of stingray use in criminal investigations). 
 396 See Tom Dart, Eye in the Sky: The Billionaires Funding a Surveillance Project Above 
Baltimore, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/15/baltimore-
surveillance-john-laura-arnold-billionaires [https://perma.cc/W8JD-PN6G] (describing the privately-
funded aerial surveillance program in Baltimore). 
 397 See Short, supra note 11, at 195. 
 398 Wexler, supra note 10, at 63. 
 399 See Harris Letter, supra note 13, at 1 (stating that disclosure “could cause significant harm to 
federal, state, and local law enforcement surveillance activities”). 
 400 See Kroll et al., supra note 180, at 634. 
 401 It is far from clear that these alternative arguments for nondisclosure would be successful. For 
one thing, the pedigree of the law enforcement privilege may not be as pristine as modern cases suggest. 
See Smith, supra note 40, at 242–46. For another, concerns that disclosure will imperil investigative 
methods frequently appear overstated. Such concerns are decidedly misplaced with respect to 
probabilistic genotyping software because criminals are (at present) unable to alter their DNA to evade 
identification. Disclosure of source code for alcohol breath test devices also has not hampered their use 
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Finally, a court-initiated disclosure requirement is not a second best 
solution; rather, it is likely to be an essential first step to improved 
innovation policy. If courts stop deferring to assertions of trade secret 
protection, other government entities will need to determine whether 
recalibrating innovation incentives is necessary to sustain innovation in this 
field. In so doing, these policymakers and purchasers may conclude that 
broader and earlier disclosure is better, both as a matter of innovation 
policy and as a matter of justice.402 After all, source code secrecy imposes 
harms not only on criminal defendants and the judiciary in whose 
courtrooms justice is meted out;403 it also imposes harms on innovation 
itself, inhibiting innovation of better software and other criminal justice 
tools.404 Earlier and broader disclosure may help to ensure that technologies 
in which the government invests considerable sums of public money is 
legitimate, reliable, and accurate—the better to ensure its future acceptance 
in individual criminal prosecutions. 
Recalling the recent experience with New York City’s own 
probabilistic genotyping software, FST, reinforces the importance of 
judicial decisionmaking in this arena. Although FST is a government-
developed tool,405 the city crime lab repeatedly resisted efforts to examine 
FST’s source code in criminal cases, describing the code as 
“proprietary.”406 But in July 2016, a federal district court ordered the 
laboratory to turn FST’s source code over to a defense expert for analysis, 
subject to a strict protective order.407 After reviewing FST’s source code, 
the expert concluded, “the correctness of the behavior of the FST software 
should be seriously questioned.”408 Not long after, the New York City crime 
 
or effectiveness. See In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 
525, 542 (Minn. 2012); State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 159 (N.J. 2008). And the content of certain 
nondisclosure agreements between the FBI and law enforcement entities belies Harris’s assertion of 
significant law enforcement secrecy concerns. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text 
(discussing Tucson’s nondisclosure agreement, which allocates the power to determine disclosure to 
Harris, thus attenuating any relationship between nondisclosure and legitimate law enforcement 
concerns). 
 402 On the importance of broad and early access to source code, see supra Part II and Section IV.B. 
 403 See supra Sections II.A–B. 
 404 See Strandburg, supra note 202 at 113; text accompanying notes 201–203 (discussing the 
relationship between disclosure and follow-on innovation). 
 405 See ProPublica Memorandum, supra note 108. 
 406 Kirchner, supra note 112 (“The office has long kept the source code secret, successfully 
opposing requests in court by defense attorneys to examine it.”); Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note 
91. 
 407 See Order at 1–2, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cr-00565 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2016); 
ProPublica Memorandum, supra note 108, at 7. 
 408 Kirchner, supra note 112. 
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lab announced that it was discontinuing use of that software.409 ProPublica 
subsequently sought to intervene in the case, requesting that the court lift 
the protective order on FST’s source code and the expert analysis.410 On 
October 16, 2017, the district court granted ProPublica’s request.411 
There was another significant consequence of the litigation 
surrounding FST: In August 2017, as ProPublica sought to unmask FST 
more fully, members of the New York City Council introduced a bill 
designed to bring greater transparency to the algorithms and other 
automated processing systems upon which city agencies frequently rely.412 
In December 2017, the Council passed an amended version of that bill, 
becoming the first U.S. jurisdiction to begin to tackle the risks arising from 
secrecy surrounding algorithmic decisionmaking in public life.413 
Thus, court-initiated disclosure under a protective order was the first 
step in a process that culminated in the publication of the source code of an 
advanced criminal justice algorithm—and that spurred legislative interest 
in greater transparency earlier and more broadly than a court could require. 
The final bill that New York City approved, however, leaves much undone. 
Most significantly, it states that “[n]othing herein shall require . . . 
disclosure of any information where that disclosure would . . . result in the 
disclosure of proprietary information.”414 The New York City Council bill 
 
 409 Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note 91. OCME also announced that, in place of FST, it 
would use the privately developed and proprietary STRmix. Id. 
 410 ProPublica Memorandum, supra note 108, at 8–9. 
 411 Order at 2, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cr-00565 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2017). Lauren 
Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New York Crime Lab’s Software for Analyzing DNA Evidence, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judge-unseals-new-york-
crime-labs-software-for-analyzing-dna-evidence [https://perma.cc/J9SF-4AVJ]. 
 412 N.Y.C. COUNCIL, INT. NO. 1696-2017 (N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/
View.ashx?M=F&ID=5386249&GUID=24719B50-305D-486F-ACA7-3178E9F32D8B 
[https://perma.cc/M3D2-5N3R]. 
 413 See N.Y.C. COUNCIL, INT. NO. 1696-2017 (N.Y. Dec. 11, 2017), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815&GUID=437A6A6D-62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0 
[https://perma.cc/389L-972M]; see also Rashida Richardson, New York City Takes on Algorithmic 
Discrimination, ACLU (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-
technologies/new-york-city-takes-algorithmic-discrimination [https://perma.cc/L468-CF95] (“A first-
in-the-nation bill, passed yesterday in New York City, offers a way to help ensure the computer codes 
that governments use to make decisions are serving justice rather than inequality.”). 
 414 See N.Y.C. COUNCIL, PROPOSED INT. NO. 1696-A, ¶ 6 (N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017), 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=5678638&GUID=2E9A800E-958D-4038-A38B-
4A101B740FFE [https://perma.cc/DEJ7-E5X6]. The bill as amended would do much less to further the 
goal of public transparency in other ways as well. In place of a requirement to publish algorithms in a 
publicly-accessible manner, the amended bill calls instead for the formation of a task force to consider 
which “agency automated decision systems” ought to be subject to transparency and disclosure 
requirements and to make recommendations about whether and in what form transparency and 
disclosure might be achieved. Id. 
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thus reaffirms the significant role that courts may play in this arena in 
compelling disclosure. Even though optimal innovation policy for criminal 
justice algorithms requires the participation of policymakers, the impetus 
for change may—and perhaps must—begin with courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The criminal justice system has experienced an explosion in the 
number, complexity, and use of privately developed software tools 
throughout the criminal justice process.415 Police employ privately 
developed investigative tools to perform crucial law enforcement functions, 
prosecutors rely on evidence produced by complex software algorithms to 
win convictions, and judges trust privately developed algorithms to 
accurately identify the likelihood that a defendant will commit another 
crime in the future. Yet, frequently, the source code of these tools—their 
“lifeblood”416—and, sometimes, their very existence and use by law 
enforcement are shielded from scrutiny. The developers of these tools 
persistently and stridently assert that disclosure will injure their competitive 
interests. And courts have largely acquiesced, despite the significant 
practical and potentially constitutional costs of such secrecy to individual 
defendants, the criminal justice system, and the development of well-
designed criminal justice algorithms more broadly. 
That is the law as it is; but that acquiescence is not inevitable. The 
government has at its disposal a multitude of alternative policy mechanisms 
to spur innovation, none of which mandate secrecy and most of which will 
easily accommodate a robust disclosure requirement. Several of these 
mechanisms are already in use, encouraging innovation through research 
and development grants and exclusive procurement contracts. Recalibrating 
the non-trade-secret rewards for innovation is likely to be particularly 
efficient and effective in this field, where government is both a funder of 
research and the primary purchaser of criminal justice algorithms. In sum, 
innovation does not require secrecy. Where, as here, secrecy imposes 
significant systemic costs, secrecy must go. 
 
 415 See Roth, supra note 20, at 1975. 
 416 Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 98–99. 
